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 Around the world, the defense policies and security 
priorities of all countries require review and revision 
that reflects the changing political environment. The end 
of the Cold War and the initiation of the War on Terrorism 
are two examples of this. It is uncertain as to which next 
world event will precipitate necessary revision and review 
of defense policies. Although for established democracies, 
such planning is difficult, for new democracies, this 
challenge is even more problematic. Instead of adopting 
another country’s defense policy or structure directly, it 
is necessary for the new democratic country to analyze and 
adjust a version which is appropriate for its individual 
defense needs and interests.  
 This thesis examines the defense policy planning 
processes of selected democratic countries in order to 
ascertain if there are any common processes, 
characteristics or experiences, and to identify 
contemporary debates and challenges. To that end, the 
United States will be the model of an established democracy 
and Estonia and Mongolia will be considered as the newly 
democratic countries. Analyzing these cases comparatively 
will enable Mongolia as a new democratic country to review 
its current defense policies and to opt for further 
improvements for its planning system. The thesis will 
attempt to answer the question, “What lessons can Mongolia 
learn from the experiences of other democratic countries 
which have already set up systems for defense policy 
planning?” 
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 Since defense policy planning process is a broad area 
of study, this thesis will focus on the basic form of the 
defense policy planning process, the key actors and their 
responsibilities, and defense policy documents at the 
national level such as National Security Strategy, National 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Around the world, the defense policies and security 
priorities of every country require review and revision 
that reflects the changing political environment. The end 
of the Cold War and the initiation of the War on Terrorism 
are two examples of this, and it is uncertain as to which 
next world event will precipitate such necessary revision 
and review of defense policies. Although for established 
democracies, such planning is difficult; for new 
democracies, this challenge is even more problematic. Even 
though defense issues are similar for all democracies – the 
war on terror, protecting one’s homeland – newly democratic 
countries cannot just transplant an established democracy’s 
defense structures and procedures into their own defense or 
security environment. Instead of adopting another country’s 
defense policy or structures directly, it is necessary for 
the new democratic country to analyze and adjust for a 
version which is appropriate for its individual defense 
needs and interests. For whilst it is impossible to compare 
a small country’s defense policy with that of a large 
country, but there are practical and valuable lessons of 
experience which can be used to help to shape a new 
democratic country’s defense policies and structures. 
Therefore, the institutional arrangements, fundamental 
structures, and basic functional processes of a larger 





                    
A. THESIS QUESTION 
This thesis examines the defense policy planning 
processes of selected democratic countries in order to 
ascertain if there are any common processes, 
characteristics or experiences, and to identify 
contemporary debates and challenges. To that end, the 
United States will be the model of an established democracy 
and Estonia and Mongolia will be considered as the newly 
democratic countries. Analyzing these cases comparatively 
will enable Mongolia as a new democratic country to review 
its current defense policies and to opt for further 
improvements for its planning system. The thesis will 
attempt to answer the question, “Which lessons can Mongolia 
learn from the experiences of other democratic countries 
which have already set up systems for defense policy 
planning?” 
Jeanne Giraldo argues that “no one model fits all” 1 in 
the relationships between the executive and the legislature 
on defense policy. This thesis will argue that even though 
there is no one model that fits every situation regarding 
the security establishment, basic defense interests, policy 
procedures, and individual actors’ actions, there are 
common processes in defense policy planning to follow when 
a country shifts from its former political form to a 
democratic model. 
Since defense policy planning process is a broad area 
of study, this thesis will focus on the basic form of the 
defense policy planning process, the key actors and their 
 
1 Jeanne Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense: Global 
Comparisons,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How, ed. Thomas Bruneau 
and Scott Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 39.  
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responsibilities, and defense policy documents at the 
national level such as National Security Strategy, National 
Defense Strategy or National Military Strategy documents. 
1. Importance  
Mongolia has been in the process of transitioning to a 
democratic system for over a decade. During this period, 
Mongolia has established fundamental legislation to govern 
its new democracy. Establishing new legislation was 
difficult and implementing these laws has been even more 
difficult. Mongolian defense-related laws define the 
structure, organization, functions of the armed forces, and 
the defense objectives for the country. What’s next? As 
Thomas Young notes, “a sound defense planning and force 
development system can only be successfully implemented if 
there is a stated and clear government policy to guide 
planners.”2 In December 2004, the Mongolian Parliament 
approved the new government action plan3 on defense. The 
government action plan stipulated that the Mongolian 
Parliament provides guidance on defense, and it states 
that,  
The defense system will be adapted with a new 
security environment and regional development 
concept and consistent with military reform in 
accordance with state military policy. Military 
organizations will be upgraded to meet modern 
 
2 Thomas Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning: The Australian 
Experience,” Armed Forces & Society, 21, no.3 (Spring 1995): 349. 
3 The Mongolian Government Action Plan directs what the Government 
will do in its four-year term, and it provides a framework of actions, 
directions, and intentions for the following branches: Public 
Administration and Civil Participation; Social Policy; Economic Policy; 
Urban Development, Regional and Rural Policies; Environmental Policy; 
Defense and Disaster Preparedness Policy; Foreign Policy; and 
Strengthening Law Enforcement Agencies. 
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requirements and the participation of armed 
forces in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping 
activities and other international missions will 
be expanded.4 
After study of the experiences of other democratic 
countries, and consideration of the current level of 
Mongolian defense resources, defense planners needed to 
follow these guidelines and prepare a strategic plan. In 
September 2006, Mongolian defense planners initiated a 
long-term strategic plan named “Armed Forces Transformation 
Program through the year of 2015.”5 The program goal is that 
the Armed Forces shall be prepared for participating in 
international peace or other military operations while 
maintaining their main objectives, such as self-defense, 
providing military support to civilian authorities, etc. 
the current capabilities, new objectives, and limited 
economic resources all resulted in challenges to the 
establishment of an efficient defense policy planning 
system.  
The practical importance of this thesis is that 
Mongolia can learn from other democratic countries that 
have set up defense policy planning processes for their 
defense structures and institutions. It is also helpful to 
define the current Mongolian defense policy planning 
 
4 Action Plan of the Government of Mongolia for 2004-2008 
(Ulaanbaatar, 2004) On-line, internet, 10 June 2006, available from 
http://www.mongolia-foreign-policy.net/eng/index.php?moduls=4.  
5 Presentation of Mongolian MOD, presented in the “National 
Security, Interagency process, Civil Military Relations, Public Affairs 
and National Military Strategy” seminar and roundtable discussion. The 
seminar was conducted by the Office of the National Security Council of 
Mongolia, the Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterey, 
California (NPS, USA), the Embassy of the United States of America in 
Ulaanbaatar, and the Ministry of Defense of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia, Sept, 2006).  
 5
process, identify the strengths and weaknesses, and suggest 
how it might be adjusted to evolving requirements. The 
conceptual importance of this thesis is that it attempts to 
describe “common processes” in a defense policy planning 
environment, based on comparative case studies.  
2. Methodology 
Using a comparative case study method, this thesis 
investigates what should be improved in the case of 
Mongolia. What can Mongolia learn from the defense policy 
planning processes of other countries? Are the experiences 
in defense policy planning of the selected countries 
applicable to other countries such as Mongolia?  The 
reasons for choosing the United States as a model, and the 
Estonian and Mongolian examples of new democracies in the 
thesis are as follows: first, the United States has 
unarguably the most sophisticated defense structure in the 
world and its policy planning is broadly considered as a 
model; and second, Estonia re-established its independence 
and democracy in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the country faced challenges that are similar to 
Mongolia’s: it was a post-communist country that underwent 
a transition to democracy. 
B. THESIS CONTENTS 
The thesis consists of the introduction, three 
chapters, and the conclusion.  
The Introduction presents the thesis question, its 
importance, research methodology, and chapter summaries. 
Chapter II identifies the U.S. defense policy planning 
process as a basic democratic defense policy planning 
 6
process. To analyze the whole process in one single thesis 
is impossible; therefore, the thesis will focus on two main 
defense policy documents, the National Defense Strategy of 
the United States of America and the National Military 
Strategy of the United States of America. It will briefly 
describe the basic process of planning these documents; it 
will describe who does the planning, and it will describe 
what the challenges are. 
Chapter III describes the fundamentals and the 
experiences of the Estonian and Mongolian defense policy 
planning process and explain those parts of the defense 
policy planning process that are specific to each of the 
countries. The chapter will also discuss the challenges and 
issues of each country’s defense policy planning process.  
Chapter IV will outline what should be changed or 
improved in Mongolian defense policy planning and study how 
Mongolia can learn from other democratic countries. The 
outline will be based on those discussed in the subsection 
of issues and challenges of Mongolia in the previous 
chapter. The chapter also discusses some supporting 
arguments and counter arguments on Mongolia’s current 
defense policy doctrines.  
The Conclusion summarizes the previous chapters’ 
findings with final thoughts. Based on the comparative case 
study, what commonalities can be found in the democratic 





                    
II. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING PROCESS IN A DEMOCRATIC 
COUNTRY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
A defense policy planning process requires the 
completion of key tasks by several organizations. Every one 
of these producing organizations has its own procedure for 
developing this process. An operation of many separate 
organizations, or agencies, and different types of 
procedures and outcomes always leads to a more complex 
environment in the defense planning process. Therefore, a 
democratic country’s defense policy planning is based on 
the international environment, its country’s national 
security interests, democratic institutional structure, and 
the individual roles of its leadership. 
Douglas Porch points out that “in peacetime, as in 
war, politicians define threats, determine political 
objectives, set the broad parameters of strategy, build 
coalitions, and provide resources. The task of the soldiers 
ideally is to argue their case, take the resources 
allocated them, and apply force to achieve the political 
goals as defined by the leaders. In return, . . . the 
soldier must have a voice in ‘setting the strategy . . . he 
must understand political constraints, but have a free 
hand’ in the operational and tactical direction of war 
unhampered by political micromanagement.”6 Sam Sarkesian, 
John Williams, and Stephen Cimbala argue that “the decision 
making process is always problematical and often 
 
6 Douglas Porch, “Strategy Formulation and National Defense: Peace, 
War, and the Past as Prologue,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How, 
ed. Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 2006), 101. 
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controversial. The process requires the interaction of 
people with differing personal, political, and 
institutional perspectives on policy issues. By design and 
evolution, the system promotes rivalry among the branches 
of the government and within those branches as policy 
questions move toward resolution.”7 
This chapter will describe the defense policy planning 
process, the role of actors, and issues and challenges that 
relate to this process, based on the United States defense 
policy. 
B. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING IN A DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY 
Defense policy planning in a democratic country 
depends on a wide range of political and defense interests, 
security and defense organizational structures, 
institutional and organizational tradition, operational 
strategy, and leadership’s role in the planning process. 
Richard Kugler defines defense planning as a part of the 
process of developing a functional strategy in his book, 
Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New methods 
for a New Era: “defense planning is preparing military 
forces to carry out national strategy.”8 Sam Sarkesian, John 
Williams, and Stephen Cimbala agree that differences of 
policy and strategy are clear: “policy refers to goals and 
strategy is the means to reach these goals. It follows that 
 
7 Sam Sarkesian, John Williams, and Stephen Cimbala, “The Policy 
Triad and the National Security Council” U.S. National Security Policy 
Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 
122. 
8 Richard Kugler, “Evaluating Strategies for Multiple Goals” Policy 
Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era 
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2006), 68. A 
functional strategy is that strategies whose focus is not geographic 
but rather a particular activity. 
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strategy or strategies cannot be realistically designed and 
implemented if policy is unclear or vacillating.”9 
The word “strategy” comes from Greek word “stratēgia” 
which means generalship.10 In the modern world, the word 
“strategy” is used in policies and doctrines, as Edward 
Earle defines it:  
Strategy deals with war, preparation for war, and 
the waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the 
art of military command, of projecting and 
directing a campaign . . . only the most 
restricted terminology would now define strategy 
as the art of military command. In the present-
day world, then, strategy is the art of 
controlling and utilizing the resources of a 
nation . . . to the end that its vital interest 
shall be effectively promoted and secured against 
enemies.11  
Specialists in the field of defense policy planning 
find that recent international defense-related activities 
and world defense policy priorities, in the defense 
planning process for the new century, have been changing 
from the old traditional objectives to more current issues 
such as combating global terrorism, protecting the 
homeland, and contending with future defense challenges and 
uncertainties. Matthew Bogdanos points out that the 
September 11, 2001, event tested the American security 
system and only its effective use of intelligence and 
 
9 See Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, “The International 
Landscape,” 36. 
10 Encyclopedia Britannica, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 
Eleventh Edition (Springfield: Merriam-Webster, 2004), 1233. 
11 Edward Earle, “Introduction” Makers of Modern Strategy: Military 
Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1943), viii. 
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interagency cooperation can defeat today’s threat.12 Some 
academics also point out that defending a country itself is 
not a popular case for today’s world; instead, countries 
often strive to join coalitions or make alliances to defend 
themselves and their interests. Therefore, the discussion 
is not about an individual country, but rather it is about 
regional, institutional and global stability and its 
participation and involvement in these higher purposes. 
Holger Molder agrees when he points out that “the key 
elements for the success of the Baltic Sea security complex 
– Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – may be overwhelmingly 
shared liberal democratic values and the international 
regime of democratic peace generally followed around the 
Baltic Sea.”13 The 2006 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report also supports the idea of international cooperation, 
partnership, and alliance systems by arguing that 
“alliances are clearly one of the nation’s greatest source 
of strength . . . alliances make manifest the strategic 
solidarity of free democratic states, promote shared values 
and facilitate the sharing of military and security burdens 
around the world.”14 
 
 
12 Matthew Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step” 
Joint Forces Quarterly, (Second Quarter, 2005): 18. 
13 Holger Molder, Head of the Analysis Section at the Defense 
Planning Department of the Estonian Ministry of Defense, “NATO’s role 
in the Post-Modern European Security Environment, Cooperative Security 
and the Experience of the Baltic Sea Region” Baltic Security & Defense 
Review (Tallinn, 8. 2006) On-line, internet, 20 February 2007, 
available from  http://www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/bsdr/1-
NATO,%20European%20Security%20and%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20Region-
Holger%20Molder.pdf.  
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
February 2006 (Washington D.C.: DOD, 2006), 6, On-line, internet, 20 
February 2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf.  
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C. U.S. DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING AS A MODEL 
The point to creating models is to simplify realities 
and variables. There are many variables and policy 
selections for creating a defense policy in today’s 
democratic countries. Obviously, there are similarities as 
well as differences among the varying countries; however, 
the issue concerns which choices are made and the path to 
be followed by each country. For example, “in 1992, the DOD 
described and discussed seven possible future scenarios, 
which might lead to military action by the U.S. After 
lengthy discussions the scenario, which stipulated the 
occurrence of two regional crises situations at a time, was 
selected as the basis for the planning of the military 
forces, including the size and the structure of the forces. 
The ‘two regional contingencies’ scenario became part of 
the ‘National Security Strategy’ presented by the President 
to the Congress.”15 Therefore, there are several policy 
options to be considered before the actual documents are 
formulated. Smaller planning units or larger institutions 
can participate in a higher level of security or defense 
policy making process. In the case of the American example 
above, two options became the policy guidance and strategy 
of the leading entities in the country because it allowed 
its institutions and armed forces to plan and implement 
accordingly. 
In the following subsections, the United States’ 
method for shaping its defense policy, the actors involved 
and the resulting challenges and issues will be discussed.  
 
15 Janos Matus, “The Policy of the United States” Civil-Military 
Relations and Decision-making on Defense (Geneva: DCAF Working Paper 
Series, no. 60, 2002), 7. 
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1. Defense Policy Planning Process and Actors 
Collins Shackelford points out in his co-edited book, 
American Defense Policy, that,  
The contemporary American defense policy process 
developed as institutions evolved, . . . it has 
faced challenges of national security by 
developing policies and programs that directly 
affect military/defense organizations, agencies, 
training, doctrine, weapons applications, weapons 
development, manpower issues, and a myriad of 
issues related to the Total Force. The processes 
associated with today’s American defense policy, 
although never imagined by the Framers of the 
Constitution, have their roots in the words of 
the Constitution.16  
In short, the fundamentals of defense came from an 
early establishment of the power of the American 
legislature, and over time the American defense system 
improved and toughened, and it built the most powerful 
defense system in the world today. Today, the U.S. defense 
policy planning systems focuses on global issues, and 
although these systems are not appropriate for a small 
country or new democratic country, they can be an example 
of lessons learned.  
A creation of the National Security Council and the 
Department of Defense (DOD) by the National Security Act of 
1947 and its reform under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 
constitute the key structural changes in the American 
defense institutional history. The National Security Act of 
1947 created the National Security Council which is 
responsible for the national foreign and defense policy; it 
 
16 Collins Shackelford, “American Defense Policy Process” in 
American Defense Policy, ed. Paul Bolt, Damon Coletta, and Collins 
Shackelford (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2005), 83. 
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established a National Military Establishment (replaced by 
the DOD under the 1949 Amendment to the National Security 
Act, headed by a Secretary of Defense) which was a 
unification of the Department of War, the Department of the 
Navy, and the newly established Department of Air Force, 
and it gave more political power to the Secretary of 
Defense.17 The Act also determines the comprehensive 
description of the President’s annual National Security 
Strategy which he’s required to submit annually to 
Congress.18  
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the next largest 
structural change for the DOD. Congress declared eight 
purposes for the act: strengthen civilian authority; 
improve military advice; place clear responsibility on 
combatant commanders for accomplishment of assigned 
missions; ensure that the authority of combatant commanders 
is commensurate with their responsibility; increase 
attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning; 
provide for the more efficient use of resources; improve 
joint officer management; enhance the effectiveness of 
military operations; and improve DOD management.19 The main 
problems identified for this reform include the following: 
imbalance between service and joint interests, inadequate 
military advice, inadequate qualifications of joint duty 
military personnel, imbalance between combatant commanders’ 
 
17 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and 
NSC (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 75. 
18 The National Security Act of 1947, On-line, internet, 24 January 
2007, available from http://www.intelligence.gov/0-
natsecact_1947.shtml.  
19 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986, On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99824pt1.pdf.  
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authority and responsibility, confused and cumbersome 
operational chains of command, ineffective strategic 
planning, inadequate supervision and control of defense 
agencies and DOD field activities, confusion on service 
secretaries’ roles, unnecessary duplication in military 
department headquarters, and congressional micro-
management.20 These problems seem to be very common problems 
in other countries, also. Of course there were many counter 
arguments. Peter Feaver points out that “one of the main 
goals of the Goldwater–Nichols Act was to weaken 
interservice rivalry by strengthening the ability of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide a joint military 
viewpoint.”21 Even though this goal is directed to 
strengthen the jointness of the armed forces, it has 
encountered another goal of civil-military relations and 
interservice rivalry, that of effectiveness. 
In order to identify defense policy planning actors 
and their roles and responsibilities in the policy planning 
process, this thesis looks to a country’s legal documents. 
According to the U.S. Constitution, the President and the 
Congress have a separate authority to formulate a national 
defense policy. The President is designated by the 
Constitution as the Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces 
(Article II, Section 2) and the Congress is empowered by 
the Constitution to “provide for the common defense”; to 
“declare war”; to “raise and support armies”; to “provide 
 
20 James Locher, “Epilogue: Unified at Last” Victory on the Potomac: 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2002), 437-450. 
21 Peter Feaver, “Informal Agency Theory,” Armed Servants: Agency, 
Oversight, and Civil – Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 82. 
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and maintain a Navy”; and to promulgate rules and 
regulations governing the armed forces (Article I, Section 
8)  
The U.S. defense organizational structure and its 
responsibilities are specified in the U.S. Code, Title 10. 
The Code specifies the relationships and objectives of each 
defense organization and the key actors in defense policy 
planning. For example, the U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, 
Part I, Chapter 7, Section 171 specifies the personnel of 
the Armed Forces Policy Council and its objectives which is 
that, “the Armed Forces Policy Council shall advise the 
Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to 
the armed forces and shall consider and report on such 
other matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct.”22 
Because of the objectives specified in the Code, the 
responsibilities of actors and organizations are 
straightforward and become obligations for these actors and 
organizations. For effective defense policy planning, the 
participation and interaction of each actor and 
organization are required in every step of the planning 
process.  
According to Glenn Hastedt, the participation of the 
Secretary of Defense within the defense policy is twofold. 
First, he plays the role of the DOD representative in 
defense policy: he coordinates and integrates the judgments 
he receives from military professionals. He also plays the  
 
 
22 U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 7, Section 171, 




                    
role of a military functionalist who consolidates 
management and policy control in the office of secretary of 
defense.23  
In the process of the U.S. defense policy formulation, 
four committees of Congress play primary roles. They 
include the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee and the two appropriations 
committees with their subcommittees on defense. 
Additionally, the Pentagon, major lobbyist groups, think 
tank organizations, such as the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, the RAND, and the United States 
Institute for Peace, and privately owned policy analysis 
institutes, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover 
Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, and individual 
members of the Congress express their opinions freely about 
incoming defense policies or released defense policies. 
Werner Feld and John Wildgen point out that “in the 
formulation of defense policy, it is fair to assume that 
the Pentagon may be very influential, but, since Congress 
holds the purse strings, individual representatives and 
senators, especially those who have acquired expert 
knowledge in the area of defense, may also inject their 
particular views on security policy and strategy.”24 The 
power of purse is the most influential tool in American 
defense policy making. In this sense, politicians’ 
involvement in presenting their views, business parties’ 
participation in promoting their interests, and independent 
 
23 Glenn Hastedt, “The Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy” American Foreign 
Policy: Past, Present, Future (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2006), 229. 
24 Werner Feld and John Wildgen, “Congressional Organization and 
Process Regarding Defense Issues,” Congress and National Defense: The 
Politics of the Unthinkable (New York: Praeger, 1985), 37. 
researchers and analysts make the American defense policy 
planning process unique in that puts the creation of 
defense policy in every ones’ hands. Even the general 
public can have a voice on the matters of defense policy. 
The following two figures on the U.S. defense policy 
planning process and actors at the national level describe 
the level of each policy document and the relationship of 
each actor in the U.S. defense policy planning 
environment.25 
 
The U.S. Constitution 
The U.S. Code
The National Security Strategy 
The National Defense Strategy
 
The National Military Strategy
  
Figure 1.   U.S. Defense Policy Planning Process at the 
National level 
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25 The author created the following two figures, based on the U.S. 
Constitution, U.S. Code, Title 10, and other Acts, as well as the 




Figure 2.   U.S. Defense Policy Planning Actors at the 
National level 
 
2. Defense Policy  
The United States has the following three defense 
policy documents at its national level: the National 
Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National 
Military Strategy. This section will briefly present these 
documents in order to describe the U.S. defense policy 
planning.  
The National Security Strategy is the basis for all 
national security, foreign, and defense policy documents, 
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and it is the document that the President uses to plan 
policy in order to fulfill its constitutional obligation: 
“to protect the security of the American people.”26 The 
National Security Strategy promises to protect the security 
of the American people, advance American interests, enhance 
global security, and expand global liberty and prosperity. 
The strategy is founded upon two pillars: the first pillar 
is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity in order 
to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to 
extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise 
development policies; and the second pillar is confronting 
the challenges of our time by leading a growing community 
of democracies.27  
Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, said in the DOD briefing on the release of the 
National Defense Strategy and the National Military 
Strategy that 
The National Defense Strategy is the guidance 
that the secretary provides to the department on 
how to – on what the department has to do to 
implement the president’s National Security 
Strategy . . . in giving the department its 
direction, the National Defense Strategy outlines 
the broader National Security Strategy of the 
United States, so that you will see that there 
are things discussed in the National Defense 
Strategy that are not DOD responsibilities or 
missions, but they’re included because it’s 
necessary for people in the department to see the 
 
26 George W. Bush, “Foreword” National Security Strategy (Washington 
D.C.: White House, 2006). 
27 The Fact Sheet: The President’s National Security Strategy 
(Washington D.C.: The White House, Friday, March 16, 2006), On-line, 
internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060316.html. 
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broader strategy to be able to understand it and 
understand what we need to do to fulfill it. 
The National Defense Strategy defines four 
strategic objectives. The first is securing the 
United States from direct attack. The second is 
securing strategic access and retaining freedom 
of action for key regions and lines of 
communication and the global commons. The third 
is strengthening alliances and partnerships . . . 
and the fourth is establishing security 
conditions conducive to a favorable international 
order.28 
The main planner or actor of this document is the 
Secretary of Defense.  
Rear Admiral William Sullivan, Vice Director, 
Strategy, Plans and Policy Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, said in the DOD briefing on the release of the 
National Defense Strategy and the National Military 
Strategy that 
The National Military Strategy takes the broad 
strategic guidance that is contained in the 
National Security Strategy and the National 
Defense Strategy and operationalizes that 
guidance for the services and for the combatant 
commanders . . . it talks about protecting the 
homeland, about preventing conflicts and surprise 
attacks, and about prevailing against 
adversaries, in the event that we actually need 
to get into conflict.29 
 
28 Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Special 
Defense Department Briefing” (Washington D.C.: DOD, Friday, March 18, 
2005), On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2512
29 RAdm William Sullivan, Vice Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Special Defense Department 
Briefing” (Washington D.C.: DOD, Friday, March 18, 2005), On-line, 
internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2512
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He also stated that the development process of these 
two documents is parallel, and “as the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense worked through developing the National 
Defense Strategy, the Office of Secretary of Defense staff 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff worked closely together to 
make sure that the two documents were aligned and 
synchronized and that there were no conflicting guidance 
contained in the documents.”30 Another DOD official news 
release clarified the timeframe for these strategies: “the 
National Defense Strategy is issued periodically, and the 
National Military Strategy is updated every two years.”31 
The main planner or actor of this document is the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
The DOD organizational structure, policy guidance, and 
operational objectives which, guided by the National 
Security and the National Defense strategies and the reform 
Acts, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, are 
included in a defense review document every four years in 
the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). The document 
is significant, because it also presents an assessment of 
the DOD strategy and capabilities for executing the defense 
of the nation and its recommendations for future changes. 
The QDR report was managed and authored by military senior 
leaders, such as the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy 
 
30 RAdm William Sullivan, Vice Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Special Defense Department 
Briefing” (Washington D.C.: DOD, Friday, March 18, 2005), On-line, 
internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2512
31 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “Department of 
Defense Releases the National Defense and National Military Strategies” 
(Washington D.C.: DOD, March 18, 2005), On-line, internet, 24 January 
2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=8318.  
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Secretary of Defense; the head of the Joint Staff, the 
Chairman and the Vice Chairman; the Service Chiefs, the 
Service Secretaries and the Service Vice Chiefs; and the 
combatant commanders.32 The QDR becomes an implementation 
plan or particular action to the Department and to the 
Services and each of the agencies and offices of the 
Department are responsible for the full implementation. 
3. Issues and Challenges in U.S. Defense Policy 
Planning 
The American defense planning system needs to 
accomplish complicated objectives. The planning system is 
massive and the process is extensive. Interagency 
involvement, policy options, and new global challenges make 
it even more complicated. After each QDR (1997, 2001, 
2006), U.S. defense strategy has been revised and developed 
to be more aligned with current global challenges and new 
security environments. The major debates in the 2006 QDR 
concern the war against terrorism, the dual theatres of 
operations abroad (Iraq and Afghanistan), and homeland 
security issues. It updates the American defense planning 
system which reflects the thinking of the senior civilian 
and military leaders of the DOD and it describes the 
transformation of the DOD and the views of its senior 
leaders as well as the shift of emphasis on a new strategic 
environment. The new environment, which is characterized by 
uncertainty and surprise, created the shift in emphasis 
 
32 Ryan Henry, the Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
News Briefing (Washington D.C.: DOD, 6 February 2007), On-line, 
internet, 20 February 2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=916
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from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning, 
and from peacetime planning to rapid adaptive planning.33  
Threat-based planning was needed during the Cold War. 
Threats were identifiable, as well as largely quantifiable. 
However, the Cold War is over and a new direction for 
uncertain security and defense environment is needed within 
the U.S. defense policy planning. Countries other than the 
United States have formed their own defense policy planning 
utilizing a defense planning solution that was considered 
to be capability-based planning which is a means of 
identifying needs, creating choices, developing solutions, 
and providing capabilities.34 The United States, Australia, 
Canada, Great Britain, and other larger democratic 
countries have capability-based planning.  
According to Paul Davis, “Capability-based planning is 
the planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities 
suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and 
circumstances while working within an economic framework 
that necessitates choice.”35 The U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld was directed to organize the Joint Defense 
Capabilities Studies Team to examine possible 
recommendation for the DOD in March 2003 and the team 
reached the following conclusion: 
 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
February, 2006, (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2006), vi, On-line, internet, 
22 February 2007, available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf.   
34 Joint Defense Capabilities Studies Team, Joint Defense 
Capabilities Study: Final Report” (Washington D.C.: DOD, December 
2003), 3. On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.paxriver.org/files/ACF1223.pdf.  
35 Paul Davis, “Summary” Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-
Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation (Santa 
Monica: RAND, April 2003), xi. 
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A capability-based approach elevates the 
discussion of joint needs to a more strategic 
level, centering on desired effects rather than 
specific weapon systems and platforms. In this 
approach, strategic objectives frame the desired 
effects, which in turn define the needed 
capabilities . . . Because a capabilities-based 
approach begins at the strategic level, top-down 
guidance is easier to incorporate—the entire 
process is more responsive to senior leader 
decisions. Another advantage to a capabilities-
based approach is that each capability has a 
materiel and non-materiel aspect to it. Every 
capability can be divided into doctrine, 
organizational, training, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities elements. As a result, 
all resources are considered when planning for 
capabilities. This holistic approach considers 
enterprise needs simultaneously with warfighting 
needs, supporting a fiscally constrained 
resourcing process.36 
The U.S. capability based planning which, as reflected 
in the 2001 and 2006 QDR, is directed to improve the gaps 
in the interoperability and the joint forces’ 
transformation. The 2006 QDR raises some challenging 
questions, concerning whether the Government is providing 
sufficient funds and forces to support its dual theatre 
missions abroad and homeland security mission at the same 
time.  
David Ochmanek and Steven Hosmer of the RAND 
Corporation, suggest that, “U.S. defense strategists and 
force planners would be well advised to begin now to 
broaden the conceptual basis for planning and assessing 
forces and to reflect that broader conceptual basis in 
 
36 Joint Defense Capabilities Studies Team, “Joint Defense 
Capabilities Study: Final Report” (Washington D.C.: DOD, December 
2003), 1-3. On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.paxriver.org/files/ACF1223.pdf. 
 25
                    
their public statements. In addition, to hedge against the 
possibility of severe budget cuts in the future, planners 
will need to design force structures, acquisition programs, 
and research and development efforts that can maintain the 
nation’s most essential military capabilities in lean 
times, while preserving a foundation for rapidly 
reconstituting forces when a triggering event or widely 
perceived deterioration in the international environment 
prompts a renewed defense buildup.”37  
What was the trend or pattern of the U.S defense 
planning system before the first QDR in 1997? Ochmanek and 
Hosmer pointed out that, “. . . history shows that even the 
most experienced observers frequently fail to predict major 
events in their areas of expertise. Misreading the future 
can be a problem, given that many decisions, such as 
whether to develop a certain weapon system, can affect 
force structure and capabilities for decades. For some 
defense planners, the ‘uncertainty’ of the world that has 
evolved since the end of the Cold War constitutes a major 
impediment to effective planning. This concern over 
uncertainty is frequently overdone. In fact, there are good 
reasons for believing that the uncertainties inherent in 
today’s world need not stymie defense planning.”38 
Definitely, ‘uncertainty’ will always be a major problem 
for today’s defense planners. Situations such as the 
possible possession of WMD by rogue states or terrorists 
become the impetus of policy, strategy, and planning 
 
37 David Ochmanek and Stephen Hosmer, “The Context for Defense 
Planning: The Environment, Strategy, and Missions,” Strategic Appraisal 
1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1997), 36. 
38 Ibid., 46.  
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changes. However, no one can predict when and if such 
things will happen or set priorities for change. As such, 
traditional defense planning systems are not applicable to 
today’s environment. Uncertainties, global security 
postures, or a country’s defense interests can occur 
spontaneously without anyone’s intention or consensus or 
anticipation, so the challenge for today’s defense planners 
is to be prepared for these.  
The question of the perfection of the United States’ 
defense policy planning system and institutional 
cooperation is also debated among defense planners, 
specialists, and academics. Michael Coss points out that, 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 moved the force 
dramatically forward by providing the 
organizational structure and joint officer 
management system, but it is now time to create a 
better process for developing and managing joint 
capabilities and doctrine and for prosecuting 
joint missions.39  
Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard argue that,  
A fundamental mismatch exists between the 
international threat environment and the current 
national-level joint interagency organizations 
undermines the ability of the United States to 
develop appropriate policies and implement 
comprehensive strategies . . . when the 
Government confronts conflated or melded problems 
that are beyond the capacity of any single 
department or agency to solve, it rarely develops 






39 Michael Coss, “Joint Professionals Here Today, Here to Stay,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly (Third Quarter 2005): 38. 
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coordinates its actions, badly integrates its 
strategies, and fails to synchronize policy 
implementation.40 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ 
(CSIS) comprehensive work on defense reform entitled, 
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a new 
Strategic Era, Phase I Report of 2004; Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New 
Strategic Era, Phase II report of 2005; and Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report: The Future of the 
National Guard and Reserves of 2006.41 The reports point to 
the next era of defense reform using a problem-centric 
approach, which means if the problem is identical the 
report will recommend the reform.42 The main goal of these 
reports is to develop a set of recommendations for 
reforming the U.S policy planning structure in a coming 
strategically uncertain era. The recommendations oversaw 
the achievements of Goldwater-Nichols’ objectives, 
unintended consequences in the Act and unforeseen 
challenges that have arisen since 1986 which the authors of 
Goldwater-Nichols did not anticipate, namely, the global 
war on terrorism.43 
 
40 Martin Gorman and Alexander Krongard, “A Goldwater-Nichols Act 
for the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Interagency Process,” 
Joint Forces Quarterly (Fourth Quarter, 2005): 39. 
41 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Reports, On-line, 
internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/reports/.  
42 Lark Murdock and Richard Weitz, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: New 
Proposals for Defense Reform,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Third Quarter, 
2005): 38. 
43 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “A Goldwater-
Nichols Scorecard,” Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New 
Strategic Era, Phase I Report, (Washington D.C.: CSIS, March 2004), 14-
20, On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/reports/. 
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D. CHAPTER FINDINGS 
The case of the U.S. defense policy planning process 
and accompanying academic work on this matter would suggest 
to a newly-formed democracy that the defense policy 
planning process is a complex and challenging one. The 
President’s National Security Strategy is interpreted as 
policy guidance to the entire Federal Government, the 
Secretary of Defense’s National Defense Strategy is 
understood as policy direction to the DOD and lower level 
defense institutions, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff’s National Military Strategy operationalizes the 
above mentioned strategies and clarifies the 
responsibilities and objectives of the combatant commanders 
at the operational level. The completion of the planning 
process is done via the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 
which identifies capabilities and challenges of the past 
years, in order to chronicle lessons learned, ensure the 
efficacy of the current organizational structure for 
fulfilling its goals and recommend necessary changes for 
the future. These suggested recommendations for the future 
can form the basis for the upcoming National Security, 
National Defense, or National Military Strategies. This 
U.S. defense policy planning process appears to be a cycle 
that provides guidance, becomes a policy or strategy, 
assesses the process and makes recommendations to the 
guidance of it.  
The U.S. defense policy planning process begins with 
the National Security Strategy (NSS). The U.S. Government 
defines this document in terms of national interests, goals 
and priorities, integrating instruments of national power, 
and national security directives. Based on the NSS, the DOD 
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defines the National Defense Strategy with strategic 
context, strategic objectives, the process for 
accomplishing its objectives, implementation guidelines, 
and strategic risk management. The next level is at the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
defines the National Military Strategy in terms of national 
military objectives, missions, tasks and end states, 
desired capabilities and attributes, priorities, strategic 
and military risk assessments, and regional assessments.44 
The strategic guidance of the U.S. defense policies is 
interpreted as a logical, conceptual, and operational flow 
that supports the U.S. military activities on a daily 
basis. 
Even though, the U.S. defense policy planning process 
case can be a good example for a new democracy, it also has 
issues and challenges that demand attention. Today’s 
unexpected and unpredictable global challenges within a 
country’s national security and national defense 
environment demands a higher degree of thinking and 
planning from the U.S. defense planners, as well as from 
other democratic countries’ counterparts. Because of the 
complexity of the U.S. defense policy planning, issues and 
challenges are produced. For example, in interagency 
cooperation, there are many issues, such as duplicating 
agencies’ roles, spreading efforts in unnecessary places, 
allocating defense resources inefficiently, etc. Thomas 
Ricks points out in his book, Fiasco: the American Military 
Adventure in Iraq, that the 2003 invasion to Iraq proved 
that a weak national security bureaucracy, an oversight 
 
44 Michael Bell, “The National Military Strategy of the United 
States of America” (NMS - JSJ5 presentation, 2004), 7. 
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failure of Congress, and a confused intelligence apparatus 
cost many American soldiers’ blood and their families’ 
tears “for the failures of high officials and powerful 
institutions.”45  
New democracies can learn some important lessons from 
the United States, such as defining policy guidance and 
strategies, formulating and operationalizing strategies, 
recommending its defense institutional reform, conducting 
defense policy and operational assessment, reviewing its 
defense organizational effectiveness, allocating its 
defense resource, etc. Options and lessons are open to all. 
In summary, in terms of the making the most effective 
defense policy planning, the issues of uncertainty, 
capability-based planning, institutional jointness, and the 
contribution to global security stability are the main 
challenges for the U.S. defense policy planning 
environment. In spite of the effective use of its 
institutional structure and operational coordination, 












45 Thomas Ricks, “A Bad Ending” Fiasco: The American Military 
Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 4. 
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III. ESTONIAN AND MONGOLIAN DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING 
PROCESS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Both Estonia and Mongolia began their journey to 
democracy about the same time in the 1990s and share many 
security and defense policy challenges of the 1990s: how to 
create an effective defense system by discovering what to 
do, how to do it, and who will do it. Since then, these two 
countries followed different paths in terms of defense 
policy planning. That said, Estonia has some similarities 
with Mongolia: it has been a geographic buffer zone between 
two giant powers with other Baltic States during the Soviet 
years46 - Germany and the Soviet Union – and has experienced 
a total change from communism to democracy. Mongolia is 
geographically located between two large and ambitious 
militaristic powers – Russia and China. Although Mongolia 
needs to have its own defense planning system which fits 
Mongolia’s requirements, it can learn lessons from the 
Estonian defense planning system and can determine whether 
it has something advantageous and applicable to itself. 
The purposes of this chapter is to describe the 
experiences of the Estonian and Mongolian defense planning 
processes, to view the specific differences between these 
processes, to understand the reasoning behind each 
country’s choices, to ascertain whether the chosen policy 
suits each country’s defense interests, and to discover if 
there could be any similar challenges for each country.  
 
46 Kai-Helin Kaldas, “Historical background” The Evolution of 
Estonian Security Options During the 1990s (Athena Papers Series, no. 
4, October 2005) On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=13950. 
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B. ESTONIAN DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING 
After the disintegration of the Soviet block, the 
political and economic conditions of all of the post-
communist countries were similar. Estonia and all other 
post-communist countries faced the same problem of securing 
their sovereignty in the international arena, establishing 
democratic institutions for the country, and defining their 
policies on common purposes – such as national security, 
foreign relations, defense, economy, and public service, 
etc.  
According to Charles Perry, Michael Sweeney, and 
Andrew Winner,  
at a broad, conceptual level, Estonia perceives 
its security as resting on two pillars, the first 
of these, drawing on the Danish model, focuses on 
the benefits derived from international 
cooperation . . . the second pillar, following 
the Finnish model, is a strategy of total defense 
in which Estonia ideally would resist or delay an 
attacker through mobilization of the populace as 
wartime reserves.47  
However, another source, Kai-Helin Kaldas, says the 
security policy option for Estonia after regaining 
independence in August 1991 was that “there were roughly 
three main policy options open to Estonia at this point: 
remaining a neutral country; cooperating regionally with 
Finland and the other two Baltic states in security 
matters; or striving for integration with Western security 
 
47 Charles Perry, Michael Sweeney, and Andrew Winner, “Estonian, 
Latvian, Lithuanian Perspectives on Security Challenges and Solutions,” 
Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Implications for U.S. 
Policy (Brassey: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 2000), 
82. 
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institutions.”48 Joining the EU and NATO, in terms of 
independence, territorial integrity, national security, and 
defense interest, was a good decision for Estonia at that 
historical moment. The main impulse to join the EU and NATO 
was assuring its security under large institutions, 
securing its independence from a Russia-threat49, and 
guaranteeing its newly acquired sovereignty.  
The Estonian Defense Development Priorities of 2003 
states that, 
NATO’s defense planning, including the planning 
for defense of NATO’s territory, is included in 
the general NATO planning process. This process 
also creates a basis for the development of the 
means and military capabilities needed for the 
defense of Estonia’s territory. In order to 
insure her proportional contribution and to make 
known Estonia’s national interests, Estonia must 
participate in the NATO Defense Planning Process 
and harmonize her national policies accordingly. 
Estonia is aiming to obtain an integral 
understanding of NATO. As this broader 
understanding is based on many different 
integrated factors, participation in the planning 
process foresees the knowledge of Allies’ defense 
plans, as well as those of future members. During 
the planning process, Estonian defense planners 
should clarify the force structure of the 
Estonian Defense Force.50  
 
 
48 See Kaldas, “Conclusion.”  
49 One of the main causes of small country to join a larger 
alliances system is to protect itself from larger adversaries. The 
creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States after the Soviet 
Union collapse would seem to be the direct predecessor of the Soviet 
Union with another name. Estonia does not want to lose its newly 
acquired independence to Russia and sees Russia as a threat. 
50 Estonian Ministry of Defense, National Defense Development 
Priorities, 2003 (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Defense, 2003) On-line, 
internet, 10 June 2006, available from 
http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=262.  
 34
                    
This called for a great deal of change. Without a 
doubt, Estonia’s membership in NATO in March 2004 and the 
EU in May 2004 played a significant role in its defense 
policy planning. The requirements51 for membership into such 
large organizations were complex and were key factors that 
enabled Estonian advancement in its defense policy 
planning. Naturally, all Estonian security and defense 
policy planning conforms with the EU and NATO’s policy 
planning procedure which diminish Estonia’s own role in the 
policy planning process. 
After two years of membership in the EU and NATO, the 
Estonian Ministry of Defense sees its 2006 defense policy 
direction as one in which, 
The security of Estonia has been ensured, at the 
same time our responsibility regarding stability 
and security in Europe, in the Euro-Atlantic co-
operation and in the whole world has increased 
considerably . . . our aim is to maintain the 
credibility earned during the accession process 
and two years of membership and to conclude the 
re-structuring of our defense forces to meet NATO 
and EU requirements . . . our performance in NATO 
and EU is and will be based on efficient and 








51 The requirements for membership onto the EU and NATO each have a 
different set of criteria. As for the EU, the “Copenhagen Criteria” 
defines what a country needs to be achieved in order to become a 
member. On-line, internet, 27 January 2007, available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/cr
iteria/index_en.htm. As for NATO, the Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
offers sound advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the 
individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. On-line, 
internet, 27 January 2007, available from 
http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html.  
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governmental agencies, information exchange and 
readiness of our officers and civil servants to 
participate in NATO and EU assignments.52  
Because of the larger organizations’ planning 
requirements, the Estonian defense policy planning process 
is somewhat simplified, but going along with the larger 
institution and doing what is required of it creates 
complications for the smaller country. Even though joining 
with these larger institutions was its ultimate goal, 
Estonia’s obligation to the EU and NATO has greatly 
increased. 
Looking back at its historical breakthrough, Estonian 
Prime Minister Andrus Ansip defined its defense policy 
development at the opening of one of senior level defense 
courses, the Fourteenth Higher Defense Course, in April 
2006, by saying: 
I consider the will of defense to be the most 
important basis for Estonia in the development of 
the national defense policy . . . the state and 
the people must inevitably make sacrifices to 
improve the defense apparatus. History has taught 
us that simply understanding this is not enough. 
Action is needed. After regaining its 
independence, the Republic of Estonia has 
proceeded precisely from this in the development 
of its defense policy. We have worked very hard 
for the development of a safe framework of 
foreign and defense policy around us . . . Our 







52 Estonian Ministry of Defense, Estonian Defense Policy 2006 
(Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Defense, 2006) On-line, internet, 10 
June 2006, available from http://www.kmin.ee/?op=body&id=400&prn=1.  
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ourselves be disillusioned by the thought that 
the work is done and now is the time to reap the 
benefits.53 
Estonian defense planners agreed that “a planning 
system and series of procedures that are based upon 
indigenous practices and realities, in addition to being 
developed in a consensus-building manner, is more likely to 
be maintained and improved upon over time than an imported 
system. Moreover, a responsive defense planning system will 
make civilian defense leadership aware of the clear costs / 
benefits implications of their decisions that must balance 
effectiveness and efficiency.”54 As a result, the new 
Estonian defense planning system is based upon military 
capabilities-based55 and consists of planning, programming, 
budgeting, and reporting. The question of how effective and 
optimal a system it is going to be is the next issue for 
the Estonian defense policy planning development system to 
consider.  
1. Defense Policy Planning Process and Actors 
Before the establishment of the Estonian Ministry of 
Defense in 1992, the Estonian Defense Force and Defense 
 
53 Andrus Ansip, Estonian Prime Minister’s Speech at the opening of 
the fourteenth Higher Defense Courses on the 24 April 2006, (Roosta: 
Estonian National Defense College, 2006), On-line, internet, 10 June 
2006, available from 
http://www.valitsus.ee/brf/index.php?id=33576&tpl=1007&external=&search=
&aasta=2006-.  
54 Thomas Young, Aldo Kask, and Jaan Murumets, “Approaching the need 
for defense reform: Background and outlines of suggested Estonian 
Defense Planning System” (Tartu: Estonian National Defense College, 
2003), 43. 
55 Ibid., 10. “Military capability” is defined as the quantitatively 
measurable capacity of each EDF structural elements to perform a given 
task under specified conditions up to established standards. Each 
structural element may have more than one capability and each 
capability may be carried by more than one structural element. 
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League56 were already formed by the Estonian nationalists 
who had a Soviet military education. The General Staff 
leadership with the Soviet military education did not 
understand well the principles of civil-military relations 
in a democracy. In consequence, there were many problems 
for dealing effectively with a civilian-led Ministry of 
Defense that was to lead defense reform.57 The reform 
focused on the Estonian defense planning and management 
system and it was begun under U.S. technical assistance 
from the Center for Civil-Military Relations. This 
technical assistance program became a project that guided 
the Estonian defense planners from March to December 2002.58 
The product of this project was the Defense Planning Manual 
of 2002 and other defense related strategic documents. 
These defense policy planning documents were important 
pieces in the process of becoming a member of the EU and 
NATO. 
In order to identify defense policy planning actors 
and their roles and responsibilities in the policy planning 
process, one must look at a country’s legal documents. 
 
56 The Defense League (National Military Strategy definition) is the 
part of the national defense system. It is a national defense 
organization that has a military structure, possesses armaments, 
carries out military exercises and operates under the Ministry of 
Defense. It is a voluntary force, organized on a national basis, that 
provides military means for achieving defense policy objectives within 
its assigned tasks, and fosters military culture and the nation’s will 
to protect Estonia’s independence and constitutional order. The Defense 
League is divided into a military component and three special 
organizations – Women’s Home Defense, Young Eagles, and Home Daughters. 
(The Defense League is equal to the American National Guard or 
Territorial defense force of Poland – the author.) 
57 Thomas Young, “Approaching the Need for Defense Reform: Early 
Lessons Learned in Estonia,” DISAM Journal of International Security 
Assistance Management (Winter 2003/2004, 26, 2), 72. 
58 Ibid., 74. 
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According to the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, 
the President is the Supreme Commander of the National 
Defense of Estonia (Chapter V, Section 78) and the 
Riigikogu (the Parliament) is empowered to “pass laws and 
resolutions”; to “elect the President of the Republic, 
pursuant to § 79 of the Constitution”; to “authorize the 
candidate for Prime Minister to form the Government of the 
Republic”; to “appoint to office . . . the Commander or 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, on the proposal of 
the President of the Republic”; to “establish state awards, 
and military and diplomatic ranks”; to “decide on the 
expression of no confidence in the Government of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister or individual ministers”; to 
“declare a state of emergency in the state, pursuant to § 
129 of the Constitution”; and to “declare a state of war, 
and order mobilization and demobilization, on the proposal 
of the President of the Republic” (Chapter IV, Section 65). 
Along side the President and the Riigikogu, the 
Government of Estonia, the National Defense Council, the 
National Defense Committee of Riigikogu, the Ministry of 
Defense, and the General Staff of Defense Forces are the 
main players in the defense policy planning environment. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense 
along with other relevant ministries and entities set 
Estonian security policy (Statutes of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs § 8, 2004 and Statutes of the Ministry of 
Defense §8, 2004) and defense policy is formulated by the 
Ministry of Defense (Statutes of the Ministry of Defense 
§6, 2004).59  
 
59 See Kaldas, “Conclusion.”  
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The National Defense Council functions as an advisory 
body to the President of the Republic in matters of 
national defense. The Council consists of the Chairman of 
the Riigikogu, the Prime Minister, the Chairmen of the 
National Defense Committee and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the Ministers of Defense, Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, and Justice, and the Commander of the Estonian 
Defense Forces.60  
In the process of Estonian defense policy formulation, 
one of the standing committees of the Riigikogu, the 
National Defense Committee, provides guidance and 
direction. The Committee participates in the process of 
shaping the security and defense policy of the state, 
initiates drafts of defense policy, and involves itself in 
the necessary proceedings of defense legal policies and 
acts.61 Also, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riigikogu 
has the authority to share its views on defense policy 
planning and to formulate process in issues of national 
security and foreign policy matters. 
Just as the U.S. Code specifies the U.S. defense 
organizational structure and their objectives, in Estonia 
the War-Time National Defense Act, 1994, the National 
Defense Duties Act, 1995, the National Defense League Act, 
1999, the Defense Forces Service Act, 2000, the Peace-Time 
National Defense Act, 2002, the Special Situations Act, 
2002, the Extraordinary Situations Act, 2002, and the 
 
60 The Peace-Time National Defense Act, Chapter 2, Article 4, 
(Tallinn: Ministry of Defense, 2002).  
61 Riigikogu, National Defense Committee, On-line, internet, 10 
January 2007, available from 
http://www.riigikogu.ee/?id=35293&op=printit&langchange=1.  
International Military Cooperation Act, 2003 specify the 
Estonian defense organizational structure and their 
objectives in various situations.  
The following two figures on Estonian defense policy 
planning process and actors at the national level describe 
the level of each policy document and the relationship of 






























Figure 3.   Estonian Defense Policy Planning Process at the 
National level 
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62 The author created the following two figures, based on the 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, the National Peace-time 
Defense Act, and other defense Acts, as well as the official websites 
of the Riigikogu and the Estonian Ministry of Defense. 
The Constitution of 




Figure 4.   Estonian Defense Policy Planning Actors at the 
National level 
 
2. Defense Policy  
Estonian defense policy at the national level begins 
with the National Security Concept of 2004 and is supported 
by the National Military Strategy of 2004.  
As in the United States, the National Security Concept 
is the key document in Estonian security and defense 
policy, but the main difference is that this policy comes 
from the Government, not from the President. Another 
interesting difference is that the document has been drawn 






The President The Chairman of 
Riigikogu 
The Chairman of the National 
Defense Committee 









The Supreme Court of 
the Republic of Estonia 










                    
Defense Act.63 In June 2002, the Riigikogu approved the 
Peace-Time National Defense Act, which defines the 
responsibilities of the main defense organizations for 
national defense, the tasks of the Defense Forces, rules 
related to preparedness for national defense and general 
principles of defense planning.64 
The main focus of the Estonian security and defense 
policy in the National Security Concept is to preserve 
Estonia’s independence and sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, constitutional order, public safety, and to 
participate in international peace operations led by the 
various international organizations, such as UN, EU, and 
NATO, as well as to ensure its “total defense”65 system.  
The National Security Concept is a mid-term 
perspective of the Government and it will be updated 
accordingly in case of security environment changes, and 
possible new options for ensuring and enhancing Estonia’s 
security.66 
The National Military Strategy is the title of the 
document for Estonian defense and military policy planning. 
 
63 The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, 2004, 
On-line, internet, 17 January 2007, available from  
http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_177/4665.html. 
64 Anonymous, “Estonia,” Military Technology (January 2004, 28, no. 
1): 97. 
65 The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, 2004. 
The Concept defines total defense as the permanent readiness of the 
mental, physical, economic, and other capabilities of the nation’ 
civilian structures, local governments, the Defense Forces (Kaitsevagi) 
and Defense League (Kaitseliit), as well as the whole population for 
solving crises, for carrying out coordinated and united action to 
prevent and repulse aggression, and for ensuring the survival of the 
nation. On-line, internet, 17 January 2007, available from 
http://www.vm.ee/eng/kat_177/4665.html. 
66 Ibid.  
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The strategy is updated every five years, but in cases of 
security and defense environment changes, it can be revised 
as necessary. The main planners or actors of this strategy 
are the Ministry of Defense with the experts of the General 
Staff of the Defense Forces under the consultation of the 
National Defense Committee and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Riigikogu.67 The Strategy assesses the 
security threat and risks in its first chapter, sets the 
principles of defense policy in its second chapter, defines 
the capability-based planning for national military defense 
in its third chapter, describes the Defense Forces and 
National Defense League in its fourth chapter, specifies 
military readiness and mobilization in its fifth chapter, 
identifies the organization of command and control in its 
sixth chapter, and directs development of national defense 
priorities for enhancing defense capability in its last 
chapter.68 
Both the National Security Concept and the National 
Military Strategy had previous versions, which were named 
the National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia 
(2001) and the Basic Guidelines of the Estonian National 
Defense Policy (1996) which came into being before the 
accession to the EU and NATO. The context and organization 
of these previous documents mainly concerned joining the EU 
and NATO, and the achievement of these goals created a new 
security environment and new requirements which caused 
these documents to change later. 
 
67 The Estonian Ministry of Defense, National Military Strategy, 
(Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Defense, 2005) On-line, internet, 17 
January 2007, available from http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=369.  
68 Ibid. 
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3. Issues and Challenges in the Estonian Defense 
Policy Planning 
Kai-Helen Kaldas points out that “Estonia’s accession 
to membership in the EU and NATO fulfilled the country’s 
long-term security policy objectives. Currently, Estonia 
faces a situation where it has attained its security policy 
goals and has not yet set new security policy objectives.”69 
This means that membership in the EU and NATO does not 
allow for Estonia to independently set its security and 
defense policy. The EU and NATO guide their member 
countries to general security and defense policy over the 
European and trans-Atlantic hemisphere, but each member 
retains responsibility for its security and defense policy 
settings, as well as its obligation to European security 
and its defensive posture. The EU battle group concept70 and 
NATO’s Response Force71 are the main drivers for the member 
countries’ national security and national defense policies. 
Estonia signed into the Nordic battle group in 2005, 
comprised of Sweden, Estonia, Finland, and Norway – and the 
 
69 See Kaldas, 53. 
70 The Battle Group Concept, adopted in 2004, describes as a minimum 
military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force 
package, capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of 
larger operations. The core of a Battle Group is a combined-arms, 
battalion-sized force: reinforced with combat support and combat 
service support elements. Christian Molling, “EU Battle Groups 2007 – 
where next?” European Security Review, no.31, (Brussels: Institute for 
Peace Research and Security Policy, December 2006) On-line, internet, 
23 February 2007, available from http://www.isis-
europe.org/ftp/Download/Battlegroups%20FINAL.pdf.  
71 The role of NATO’s Response Force is to provide an integrated and 
fully interoperable sea, land and air capability, under one command, 
wherever the North Atlantic Council requires, to prevent conflict or 
threat from escalating into a wider dispute. The 9/11 attacks was the 
impetus for the creation of NATO’s Response Force. Carlo Masala, “NATO 
Response Force and Battle Groups: Competition or Complementarity” 
Research Paper no.18, (Rome: NATO Defense College, May 2005) On-line, 
internet, 23 February 2007, available from 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_18.pdf. 
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Battle Group is supposed to be operational in January 
2008.72 Estonia has also participated in NATO’s Response 
Force with a naval ship and mine clearance experts since 
2005.73 Planning and participating in two separate 
operations of two different institutions is challenging. 
Colonel Peter Faber, Researcher at the Academic 
Research Branch of the NATO Defense College, discusses 
national level issues and dilemmas in long term defense 
planning for NATO‘s smaller members thusly: “stable or 
lower national level budgets plus increased operating costs 
mean less investment capital for defense. At the same time, 
a growing and more complex range of NATO missions and tasks 
will require a broader ‘toolbox’ which provides a broad 
range of capabilities, and leads to mounting running costs; 
it spreads out capital; and it typically stints on 
training, maintenance, and readiness costs. The results are 
thus a toolbox that can become unaffordable and, worse yet, 
militarily irrelevant.”74 It would seem that, if the expense 
under the membership of larger institutions grows, 
continues, and pressures the national economy, one might 
wonder whether the Estonian government can continue under 
these conditions. It may create concerns among top 
 
72 Estonian Ministry of Defense, “Estonia and European defense 
issues” (Tallinn: Estonian Ministry of Defense, 2006) On-line, 
internet, 21 January 2007, available from 
http://www.kmin.ee/?op=body&id=393&prn=1.  
73 Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association, “Estonian Participation in 
NATO operations” (Tallinn: Estonian Atlantic Treaty Association, 2006) 
On-line, internet, 21 January 2007, available from 
http://www.eata.ee/?id=378.  
74 Peter Faber, “NATO Long-Term Defense Planning: Implications for 
the Future – Findings and Conclusions,” in NATO Long-Term Defense 
Planning Seminar for Planners (Rome: NATO Defense College, 9-10 October 
2003) On-line, internet, 17 January 2007, available from 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/ltdp.pdf.  
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politicians and the public, unless the larger institutions 
allow some kind of financial assistance or support.  
The Defense Planning Manual is a policy planning 
document produced with the assistance of the CCMR, but it 
has not yet been fully implemented as a system. “It takes a 
time,” said the Advisor to the Commander of the Estonian 
Defense Force, Dr. Jaan Murumets, “the challenges remain 
the same ones that initiated major reform effort in 2000, 
such as the disconnection between policy and military 
planning, outdated operational planning methodology; and 
underdeveloped resource planning and management.”75 Dr. 
Murumets responded the author’s question that asked what 
challenges Estonia currently faces under the EU and NATO 
membership as a small country, by saying that “there are 
three groups of problems for strategic-level defense 
planners: first, how to balance, within existing resource 
constraints, development of initial self-defense capability 
and contributions to allied/international crisis response 
efforts; next, how to balance potentially competing 
requirements of the NATO and the EU in terms of 
participating in NATO-led vs. EU-led operations; and then, 
how to develop and sustain a Force Structure capable of 
providing initial self-defense and a supporting 
multinational crisis response.”76 
Estonia faces its next large challenge, that of 
shifting from a General Staff system to a Joint Staff 
 
75 Dr. Jaan Murumets (Advisor to the Commander of the Estonian 
Defense Force, Deputy Director of the Center for Applied Studies), in 
discussion with the author on the Estonian defense policy challenges 
(NPS, Monterey, CA, January, 2007). 
76 See Murumets, discussion.  
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planning system. So, there are plenty of lessons, 
experiences, and problems that can be good examples to 
other countries, such as Mongolia. Dr. Murumets says that 
“the basic principles for this change rests on strong 
political support of the Defense Minister and firm 
professional leadership of the Chief of General Staff and a 
shared vision of the expected outcome – everyone should be 
part of the change, not ‘victims’ of the change.”77  The 
greatest challenges to encounter would be in the complete 
changes of regulations, standing operational procedures, 
and training and education of the personnel. According to 
Dr. Murumets, “in the context of shifting from a Prussian-
type General Staff to NATO-type Joint Staff, there are two 
main challenges: to implement NATO-compatible Operational 
Planning Process (OPP) as the primary operational planning 
methodology; and man the key staff department with officers 
who have knowledge of OPP from Western Staff colleges. 
Secondary concern would be integrating OPP into all levels 
of curricula taught in national military academies and 
colleges.”78 
According to Perry and others, Estonia would quite 
likely face difficulties in implementing an effective 
strategy of its total defense planning and in filling the 
arsenal with the necessary table of equipments – due to the 
shortage of funds, and in manning the specialized 
personnel.79 Planning a comprehensive coordination of 
 
77 See Murumets, discussion. 
78 See Murumets, discussion. 
79 Charles Perry, Michael Sweeney, and Andrew Winner, “Estonian, 
Latvian, Lithuanian Perspectives on Security Challenges and Solutions,” 
Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Implications for U.S. 
Policy (Brassey: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. 2000), 84. 
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nationwide civil military structures is among the most 
difficult tasks. It requires effort and time. Estonian 
total defense planning and its strategies are being 
operationalized in the National Military Strategy of 2004 
and planned in the Force Structure and Development of the 
Estonian Defense Forces 2010 of 2004. The existence of 
National Defense League has an important role in the 
implementation and comprehensive coordination of a 
nationwide territorial defense system.  
C. MONGOLIAN DEFENSE POLICY PLANNING  
In the early years of the Mongolian transition to 
democracy in the 1990s, Mongolia found itself needing to 
change its national security and national defense policies. 
There were three reasons for Mongolia to have a new defense 
policy: the collapse of the Soviet block, the security 
environment changes in the region after the Cold War, and 
domestic political and social reforms to democracy.80  
In the last seventeen years, Mongolia has been 
transforming itself into a democratic system, and has 
established the legal standards for its new democracy and 
new democratic institutions. As in the case of the United 
States and Estonian counterparts, Mongolian defense and 
defense related laws specify the defense organization and 
structure, functions of the armed forces, and the defense 
objectives for the country. According to the Constitution 
of Mongolia, “Mongolia shall have armed forces for self-
defense. The structure and organization of the armed forces 
and the rules of military service shall be determined by 
 
80 Charles Morrison and Christopher McNally, “Mongolia,” Asia 
Pacific Security Outlook 2001 (New York: An APAP project, 2001), 114. 
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law” (Article 11, Section 2). This statement makes it clear 
that within the Mongolian defense policy environment, all 
defense related activities, operations, relations and 
actions must be covered by law in order to perform 
functionally and legally.  
Additionally, Douglas Porch points out that, 
With the demise of its major ally and protector 
the Soviet Union, Mongolia determined that its army, 
composed of heavily armored units, could no longer 
guarantee its security. China may continue to 
constitute a distant threat, but the best way to 
guarantee Mongolia’s security, is to build credibility 
within the international community by engaging in 
peacekeeping operations.81  
 
It is true that Mongolia has been left with no 
“umbrella” or “collective” protection and pursued self 
defense and territorial defense policies in its new 
security environment after the Cold War. A state 
centralized plan is not appropriate in today’s Mongolian 
defense policy planning system. The old pattern of defense 
policy was vested in the Soviet security vision which can 
be described as follows: “the major strength of the Soviet 
decision-making process lies in its centralization of 
power. Once a decision is made, it can be executed 
swiftly.”82 Historically, Mongolia did not plan its national 
security policy and its military strategy; the Soviets 
provided Mongolia with a military protection plan, security 
policy, and weaponry and techniques. Therefore, its 
 
81 See Porch, 113. 
82 Harriet Scott, “The Soviet Decision-making Process for National 
Security Policy,” in National Security Policy: The Decision-making 
Process, ed. Robert Pfaltzgraff and Uri Ra’anan (Hamden: Archon Books, 
1984), 106. 
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national security and national defense policy planning was 
totally new for Mongolian defense planners in the 1990s. 
Because of a definite influence by global and regional 
security environmental change, as well as political and 
economic transition inside the country, Mongolia shifted 
its military from the old collective defense system to one 
based on self-defense and a territorial defense system with 
nontraditional objectives, such as disaster relief, 
humanitarian assistance, and international peacekeeping 
operations which were given priority. Planning for these 
new objectives proved to be a challenging one to ensure its 
national security interests, as well as national defense 
interests. 
Bold Ravdan has described the defense policy of small 
states by stating that “the defense system of all small 
nations is based on a civilian society, flexibility, and 
numerous partners. In this sense, Mongolia’s defense 
mentality vastly differs from that of its two neighbors 
which give priority to the militarization of the society, 
that are on excessive guard against anything new and that 
believe in numbers.”83 Therefore, Mongolian defense policy 
needs to be designed within the structure of “small 
nations, with vast territory, small population, limited 
resources, and that conduct a non-aligned policy in times 
of peace, and that do not have the independent military 
capability to repel foreign aggression and intervention, 
are forced to rely on local defense (territorial defense) 
 
83 Bold Ravdan, “Defense policy of small state” The Security of 
Small State: Option for Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2000), 34. 
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structure.”84 The Constitution of Mongolia declares the 
country will have a self-defense force; the Law on Defense 
is tasked with building a territorial defense force; and 
the Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia affirms 
that an integrated defense system is the main direction for 
Mongolian defense policy planning.  
The national security and national defense situation 
described in the Estonian case pretty much existed in the 
Mongolian case, but Mongolia was not encouraged to join any 
of the larger security institutions that Estonia was; 
instead, it opted for establishing self-defense and a 
territorial defense system and searched for third neighbors 
for assuring its national security and defense interests 
and international cooperative purposes. The 2001 Mongolian 
Defense White Paper states that,  
Grounds for protecting the political-military 
security of Mongolia, is hoped to be accomplished 
through active participation in multilateral 
security dialogues, creating a military 
confidence with other nations and providing 
transparency in military affairs . . . specific 
feature of the security of a small state is that 
it is highly vulnerable and dependent on the 
external situation, especially on changes 
occurring in politics, economy and military of 
larger neighboring nations. Therefore, the basic 
means of ensuring favorable external environment 
for Mongolia’s national security rests in 
political and diplomatic measures.”85  
In terms of defense policy planning, the system that 
is currently installed within the Mongolian defense policy 
 
84 Bold Ravdan, “Defense policy of small state” The Security of 
Small State: Option for Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 2000), 34. 
85 Ministry of Defense, Mongolian Defense White Paper, 2001 
(Ulaanbaatar: MOD, 2001), 43. 
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planning environment still needs to be developed. Why it is 
not quite good enough, what it needs to fulfill, and what 
the challenges will be are discussed in the next few 
subsections. 
1. Defense Policy Planning Process and Actors 
Mongolia has made considerable changes within all of 
its major military elements in the last decade or so. These 
changes would include its defense legal system, defense 
policy basis, force structure, training objectives, and the 
usage of the armed forces. It has reduced the number of 
military installations, established new military 
installations for peacekeeping training, and developed 
training doctrines and manuals for fulfilling new 
objectives of military operations other than war.  
The creation of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) in 1992 was an important institutional development 
toward achieving Mongolia’s democratic transition and 
enabling the armed forces to reform. The MOD had to 
redefine Mongolia’s military role in democracy, initiate 
military reform programs; and most importantly, it needed 
to establish a defense legal basis in its developmental 
transition. The first Mongolian Defense White Paper, 
published in 1997, states that “the MOD has been re-
structured to become a policy ministry which executes 
Government defense policy, establishes priorities for 
defense activities, programs, objectives, and mission and 
administers civilian control over the armed forces.”86 If 
Mongolia considers its defense institutions and their legal 
 
86 Ministry of Defense, Mongolian Defense White Paper, 2001 
(Ulaanbaatar: MOD, 2001), 48. 
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basics are pretty much established, then, Mongolia should 
re-consider the effectiveness of its defense institutions 
and defense planning process. 
Concerning actors and institutions, according to the 
Constitution of Mongolia, the President is designated as 
the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces of Mongolia 
(Article 33, Section 2) and the State Great Hural of 
Mongolia (the Parliament) is empowered to “enact laws, make 
amendments to them”; to “define the basis of the domestic 
and foreign policies of the State”; to “determine and 
change the structure and composition of the Standing 
Committees of the State Great Hural, the Government and 
other bodies directly accountable to it according to law”; 
to “pass a law recognizing the full powers of the President 
after his/her election and to relieve or remove the 
President”; to “appoint, replace or remove the Prime 
Minister, members of the Government and other bodies 
responsible and accountable to the State Great Hural as 
provided for by law”; to “supervise the implementation of 
laws and other decisions of the State Great Hural”; to 
“declare a state of war in case the sovereignty and 
independence of Mongolia are threatened by armed actions on 
the part of a foreign Power, and to abate it”; and to 
“declare martial law if public disorders in the whole or a 
part of the country's territory result in an armed conflict 
or create a real threat of an armed conflict, or if there 
is an armed aggression or real threat of an aggression from 
outside” (Article 25, Section 1 and 3). The State Great 
Hural defines the basics of state military policy, 
structure and organization of the armed forces and other 
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troops, regulations governing their replenishment, and 
number of military personnel in peacetime.87 
The National Security Council, headed by the President 
and consisting of the Speaker of the State Great Hural and 
the Prime Minister, has a primary role in national security 
and national defense policy making. The President submits 
proposals on the basics of state military policy, 
structure, and organization of the armed forces to the 
State Great Hural, and supervises the implementation of 
defense policy and military doctrine.88 According to the Law 
on Defense, the Ministry of Defense initiates a national 
defense policy and submits it to the National Security 
Council for the Council’s approval. The Council makes its 
recommendation and submits it to the President or the State 
Great Hural for approval, and then, the policy is approved 
by the President or the State Great Hural. A defense reform 
program has the same procedure for approval.  
The Standing Committees on Security and Foreign 
Policy, on the State Structure, on budget, and on Legal 
Affairs are responsible for representing, initiating, and 
determining defense and defense-related policies in the 
State Great Hural. The Standing Committee on Security and 
Foreign Policy has the leading role among others on defense 
policy, and it is responsible for issues of National 
Security of Mongolia, Defense and Armed Forces of Mongolia, 
and Foreign Policy. The Standing Committee on the State 
Structure has the second main role and it is responsible 
 
87 Ministry of Defense, Mongolian Defense White Paper, 2001 
(Ulaanbaatar: MOD, 2001), 71. 
88 Ibid. 
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for the issues regarding the State Administrative and 
Executive Organizational Structure. The Standing Committee 
on budget has the main role for the budgetary issues of 
defense. The Standing Committee on Legal Affairs has the 
main role on legal policies of Mongolia.89 It would seem 
that, because of the diverse participation of the Standing 
Committees on defense policy matters, it has both a 
positive and negative impact. The positive impact on 
defense policy planning would be that of wide spectrum 
civil-control over the military. The negative impact would 
be that of weak understanding regarding defense and 
military activities and often being an obstacle for further 
development, especially on budgetary issues for 
transformation. 
The Government is required to provide leadership of 
central state administrative bodies and to strengthen the 
country’s defense capabilities.90 Similar to the U.S. Code, 
Mongolia has specified the objectives and relationships of 
each defense organization and their actors in the Law on 
the State Great Hural, Law on the President of Mongolia, 
Law on the Government of Mongolia, Law on Defense, Law on 
Armed Forces, and Law on Border. The Government implements 
the state defense policy, forms and replenishes necessary 
material reserves, takes measures for strengthening the 
armed forces, provides mobilization preparedness of the 
 
89 The State Great Hural, “Standing Committees” Official website, 
On-line, internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.parl.gov.mn/home.php.  
90 Tsedendamba Batbayar, “New Constitution of 1992 and New Actors” 
Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identity and New Challenges 
(Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 51. 
country in peacetime and concludes agreements on military-
technical cooperation with other countries.91 
The following two figures on the Mongolian defense 
policy planning process and actors at the national level 
describe the level of each policy document and the 
relationship of each actor within the Mongolian defense 
policy planning environment.92 
 
The Constitution of Mongolia
The Concept of National 
Security 
The Concept of Mongolia’s 
Foreign Policy 
The Basis of the State 




Figure 5.   Mongolian Defense Policy Planning Process at the 
National level 
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91 Ministry of Defense, Mongolian Defense White Paper, 2001, 
(Ulaanbaatar: MOD, 2001), 72. 
92 The author created the following two figures, based on the 
Constitution of Mongolia, the Basis of the State Military Policy of 
Mongolia and other defense laws, as well as the official websites of 
the State Great Hural, the Government of Mongolia, and the Ministry of 
Defense. 
The Constitution of 
Mongolia 
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Figure 6.   Mongolian Defense Policy Planning Actors at the 
National level 
 
2. Defense Policy  
Because of its stable external and internal security 
environment, “Mongolia is able to conduct an independent 
and neutral defense policy in harmony with its national 
interests and self-defense principles and norms.”93 The key 
documents for Mongolia’s defense policy environment are the 
Concept of National Security, the Concept of Mongolia’s 
Foreign Policy, the Basis of the State Military Policy of 
Mongolia and other defense and defense-related laws and 
acts. Mongolia has both concepts and policy basics of its 
defense policy, but it does not have any documents for the 
National Security, the National Defense, and the National 
Military Strategies similar to the United States.  
 
93 Charles Morrison, “Mongolia,” Asia Pacific Security Outlook 2003 
(New York: An APAP project, 2003), 109. 
 
The National Security 
Council 
The Supreme CourtThe Speaker of the 
State Great Hural 
The Chairman of the 
Standing Committee of 
State Foreign Policy 
The Prime MinisterThe 
President 
The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs  
The Minister of 
Defense 
The Chief of 
General Staff 
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The Mongolian defense policy planning process begins 
with the Concept of National Security of Mongolia. It was 
adopted by the State Great Hural in 1994 and defined the 
National vital Interests of Mongolia, Goals and Priorities, 
Factors Affecting National Security, Way and Means of 
Ensuring National Security, Security Guarantees, and System 
of Ensuring National Security. The Concept of National 
Security of Mongolia is the basis for all other security 
and national defense policy documents, as well as the Law 
on National Security of 2001. The Law on National Security 
of 2001 is not a policy document; it is an Act or Law, 
which specifies the objectives and responsibilities of 
certain institutions and individuals. Therefore, the 
Concept of National Security of Mongolia is mainly 
discussed in this subsection. The Concept states not only 
traditional goals of national interests, such as 
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 
inviolability of State frontiers, but also, the existence 
of the Mongolian people and their civilization, relative 
economic independence, sustainable ecological development 
and national unity.94 While “the definition of national 
security has broadened, so have the ways and means to 
secure these goals. Political and diplomatic methods are 
prioritized rather than military methods.”95 This idea is 
also expressed in the Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy.  
 
94 The Concept of National Security of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar, 1994).  
95 Boldbat Khasbazar, “National Security Council of Mongolia – 
Promoting Civil-Military Relations” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, March 2004), 13. 
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The Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy was adopted 
in 1994 and defined the national foreign policy directions. 
The Concept states that, 
In its foreign policy Mongolia shall uphold 
peace, strive to avoid confrontation with other 
countries and pursue a multi-base policy . . . 
Mongolia shall seek to guarantee its interests in 
the international arena through bilateral and 
multilateral treaties and agreements . . . as a 
member of the world community Mongolia shall 
strive to make active contribution to the common 
cause of settling pressing regional and 
international issues.96  
The Concept enables Mongolia to have friendly multi 
partners’ relations, a bilateral or multilateral security 
guarantee, and defense cooperation with other larger or 
developed countries. The Concept’s main value is in 
introducing multi-pillar foreign policy and foreign policy 
consistent with Mongolia’s national interests.97 
The Mongolian Parliament adopted “The Basis of the 
State Military Policy of Mongolia” in 1998, which is a 
direct predecessor of previous document called the 
Fundamentals of State Military Policy, and this policy 
states that, 
The state military policy is the official view of 
the state defining the attitude of the state 
inter alia armed aggression, averting the threats 
of wars and armed conflicts, safeguarding the 
country from external armed intervention, 




96 The Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy (Ulaanbaatar, 1994). 
97 Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New 
Identity and New Challenges (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 2002), 12. 
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conducting armed struggle, and it shall be based 
on the self-defense principles of the 
Constitution of Mongolia.”98 
“The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia” 
is the basis of all Mongolian defense and defense-related 
laws and acts.99 The National Security Council of Mongolia 
oversees how this document relates to other defense and 
defense related laws.100 The Basis will be adjusted 
accordingly by the State Great Hural with the proposal of 
the President if the international and regional military 
situation changes.101 This document and the Law on Defense, 
the Law of the Armed Forces, the Law on Military duties of 
Citizens and the Legal status of Military personnel, the 
Law on Mobilization, the Law on the State of War are the 
main laws concerning defense matters of Mongolia and are 
considered as the framers of the Mongolian defense policy. 
The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, 1994, 
the Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, 1994, the Basis 
of the State Military Policy of Mongolia, 1998, gives 
doctrinal and conceptual guidance to the Mongolian military 
establishment as well as defense civilian institutions. 
Based on these doctrines and concepts, a number of laws and 
government directives were adopted to coordinate military 
and civilian institutional relations and to organize their 
institutional structure. Upon the adaptation of these legal 
documents, the Mongolian Armed Forces moved toward building 
 
98 Annex to Resolution 56/1998 of the State Ikh Khural of Mongolia, 
“The Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia” (Ulaanbaatar, 
1998). 




a professional Armed Forces in a new era. In order to 
achieve this main goal, these Mongolian defense and 
defense-related laws, policies and concepts are directed to 
improving its defense capability, identifying its problem 
areas, seeking an appropriate and capable force structure, 
changing the roles of traditional military capabilities to 
more international military operational capabilities and 
domestic disaster relief operational capabilities, and 
preparing for any future uncertainty. In other words, to 
bring the armed forces closer to the standards of a 
professionally-oriented army by making fundamental and 
qualitative changes in its legal establishment, force 
structure, organization, technical condition of equipment, 
personnel, military training system, logistics, civil-
military relations, and civil control over the armed 
forces. 
The Mongolian Government, specifically the Ministry of 
Defense, initiates defense developmental programs through 
“Development Program for the Armed Forces” of 1993-1997, 
“Military Reform Policy” of 1997-2001, the “Development 
program of the Military Establishment till 2005” of 2002, 
and “Armed Forces Transformation Program through the year 
of 2015” of 2006 with Military Objectives, Missions, Tasks, 
Priorities, Structural Developments, Force Structure 
Improvements, and Force application, and the President 
approves them. These programs were all mid-term strategic 
programs that aimed to develop professional-oriented Armed 
Forces, to manage the available defense resource 
effectively, and to keep the continuous qualitative 
development of programs. Moreover, Concepts of National 
Security and Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, the Basis of the 
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State Military Policy of Mongolia, Defense and Defense 
related laws, and these mid term Strategic Programs are 
broadly considered as a National Defense Strategies among 
the Mongolian defense planners. 
Mongolia assesses each reform program regarding its 
military structure and organization, personnel 
developments, renovations of the armaments and equipment, 
improvements of its military training objectives, and its 
operational capabilities. The results of the assessment 
present the challenges that need to be addressed in the 
future: improving the capability of leadership, planning 
and managing to stay abreast with the training of permanent 
staff members, improving the performance of special duties 
and combat missions, and improving the training and 
readiness of the territorial defense system.  
In May 2004, May 2006, and September 2006 through 
January 2007, the U.S. Institute for Defense Analyses and 
the Mongolian MOD conducted a joint assessment on the 
Mongolian defense resource management, a joint defense 
technical assessment, and a defense resource management 
simulation exercise. The first joint assessment team 
produced a set of recommendations for Mongolia and the 
second assessment team assessed the implementation of those 
recommendations and proposed further improvements. The 
joint defense technical assessment report recommended 
further work in the area of cost analysis and program 
development and planning.102 The role of the joint 
assessment team was to guide the Mongolian defense planners 
 
102 The Joint Defense Resource Assessment team report, distributed 
to Mongolian MOD specialists and GS officers (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian 
MOD and U.S. Institute for Defense Analyses, January 2007). 
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to a direction of understanding as to defense resource 
management, how to relate defense resources to defense 
policy planning, and how to coordinate mid term and long 
term defense programs within the available financial 
sources and budget. The main learning point from the serial 
joint assessments was the understanding that resource 
management links strategy and policy to future military 
capabilities through the development and implementation of 
affordable mid-term program plans and annual budgets.103 
The next subsection will discuss some arguments and 
counter arguments that relate to current Mongolian issues 
and challenges on defense policy planning and look for 
possible solutions and options, based on the experiences of 
other democracies. 
3. Issues and Challenges in the Mongolian Defense 
Policy Planning 
As in other democratic countries, “the government of 
Mongolia is adjusting its defense policy and structure to 
meet the new challenges of the contemporary world,”104 but 
some points need to be considered in terms of defense 
policy planning. For example, are the 1994 Concept of 
National Security, the 1994 Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign 
Policy, and the 1998 Basis of the State Military Policy of 
Mongolia still up to date to world current security and 
defense issues, or are these needing to be updated? The 
explanation of why these doctrines and concepts are still 
standing might be defined in the following terms: 
 
103 Ibid. The Study team presentation “Defense Resource Management: 
Its Concept and Application in Mongolia” 19 January 2007. 
104 Charles Morrison and Richard Baker, “Mongolia,” Asia Pacific 
Security Outlook 2005 (New York: An APAP project, 2005), 125. 
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- A small country’s defined policy of self-defense 
and neutral position remains until its independence 
and security is in danger 
- Since the end of the Cold War, Mongolia’s two 
large neighbors, Russia and China, have had relatively 
secure and stable relations with Mongolia and both 
have bilateral treaties with Mongolia: the “Treaty on 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia 
and the Russian Federation” of 1993 and the “Treaty on 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Mongolia 
and the People’s Republic of China” of 1994, ensured a 
climate of no immediate threat.  
- These Concepts are the basics, fundamentals, and 
principles of national security and national defense 
policy. All defense-related laws and documents have to 
be developed upon these Concepts. 
The counter arguments to these explanations might be 
defined in the following terms: 
- Although the possibility of future danger for 
Mongolia is uncertain, Mongolia should not remain in 
the position of neutrality. Mongolia needs to prepare 
for any uncertainty that might come. For example, in a 
worst case scenario, Mongolia would need immediate 
protection from any one of a number of possible 
alliances against possible adversaries, but it might 
be impossible if Mongolia is not a member of that 
alliance. The United Nations would intervene, but the 
heavy bureaucracy and procedures could not provide 
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protection within 60-90 days.105 Joining alliances 
takes much longer, maybe for four or five years, maybe 
ten. In the case of Estonia, it took thirteen years, 
1991-2004. 
- Mongolia’s two neighbors have stable security 
policies with Mongolia, but these two countries are in 
their transitional periods. Both countries have had 
issues of ethnic separation struggles for many years 
now – in Russia, Chechnya, and in China, Tibet and 
Taiwan. If the internal conflicts of two countries 
spill over to neighboring provinces and other ethnic 
groups, like the Domino Effect,106 the reactions could 
be unpredictable and devastating for Mongolia. Mr. 
Ganbold G., the Secretary in the Office of National 
Security Council, said in a discussion on National 
Security matters in the Journal of Defense Studies of 
Mongolia, “in the last ten years or so, the situations 





105 Lecture statement by Professor Kenneth Dombroski from Seminar in 
Military Operations other than War, at Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 22 February 2007. In general, the UN is incapable of a 
rapid military response; 60 to 90 days is usually the minimum time 
needed to get an operation organized and on the ground.  East Timor 
required immediate intervention, but it was Australia leading a 
coalition of the willing that intervened initially rather than the UN.  
Smaller observer missions are capable of moving in quicker, and if 
there is another mission nearby that can be used to siphon off some 
troops, then that will reduce the initial response time. 
106 Presentation by Professor Alice Miller of Seminar in Asia in 
World Affairs, at Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 25 February 
2007. Domino Effect – Domino Theory – used in early 1950s in the U.S. 
foreign policy papers: such as, NSC 64 “The Position of the United 
States with Respect to Indochina” (27 Feb 1950). Losing one another and 
in the end lost everyone, like chain reaction. 
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greatly changed. The old traditional national security 
issues may be gone, but new, more dangerous ones might 
occur”107 
- These Concepts are the basis of national security 
and national defense policies and based on these 
Concepts, Mongolia should define its National Security 
and National Defense Strategies. Why? Because Mongolia 
does not have the means and strategies to achieve 
these conceptual basics and fundamentals. Colonel 
Suzanne Gehri points out that “the lack of an 
effective National Security Strategy and planning 
process adversely impacts Mongolia’s defense and 
intelligence capabilities . . . the older National 
Security Concept and Defense Laws and the mindset of 
senior military leaders, lock the military into the 
traditional missions of territorial and air defense – 
missions which are barely possible with 100K Soviet-
era force and literally impossible with the current 
11,000 man force operating with Soviet-era equipment . 
. . it is difficult to see how the reforms advocated 
in MOD 2015 can be achieved without simultaneous 
attention to developing the capabilities for strategic 
planning in the NSC, MOD, and General Staff.”108 
Mr. Ganbold G. said that “some analysts stress that 
the National Security Concept is a complex mid term policy 
concept. It has been several years since this document was 
 
107 Ganbold. G, “The Issues on National Security matters” the 
Journal of Defense Studies no.2(12) (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Institute 
for Defense Studies, 2004): 10. 
108 Colonel Suzanne Gehri, e-mail message to author. 26 February 
2007.  
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adopted and I will not deny that there is a reason to amend 
accordingly to the current situational changes.”109 
A transitional democracy’s common challenges continue 
to exist in Mongolian defense policy planning; good 
examples would include weak military knowledge among top 
civilian authorities, lack of interest for defense issues, 
coherent civil-military relations on defense policy, and 
shortage of funds, etc. The 2001 Mongolian Defense White 
Paper states that “emerging favorable external security 
environment for Mongolia allows the nation to limit the 
defense budget and cut it down to the very necessities in 
order to maintain its Armed Forces and other troops. 
Therefore, the entire defense budget is comprised of two 
items: salary for personnel and current expenditures. No 
investment of funds has been made for development, 
equipment renovation or repair since 1988.”110 Currently, 
the new defense policy direction of military diplomatic 
relations with third neighboring countries is creating 
fruitful outcomes to the newly developing Mongolian Armed 
Forces. Other democratic countries, such as the United 
States, Germany, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Great Britain, 
etc., are offering various programs for professional 
military education and training. The United States is the 
biggest contributor among them. Since 1992, Mongolia has 
been actively supported by the United States with programs 
such as the Asia Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building 
Program, the Enhanced International Peacekeeping 
Capabilities program, the Multinational Planning 
 
109 See Ganbold. 
110 Ministry of Defense, Mongolian Defense White Paper, 2001 
(Ulaanbaatar: MOD, 2001), 63. 
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Augmentation Team program, the International Military 
Education and Training program, and others. The latest 
assistance from the United States tops off at $18 million - 
the Global Peace Operations Initiative ($4.5 million) - 
which offers great support for Mongolian peacekeeping 
training.111  
The U.S. Center for Civil-Military Relations has also 
conducts seminars on National Security, Interagency 
processes, Civil-Military Relations, Public Affairs and 
National Military Strategy since 2001. The Center presented 
seminars to top Mongolian political civilian leaders and 
military leaders, as well as to the Office of National 
Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Ministry of Defense personnel and became a significant 
contribution for the Mongolian national security and 
national defense policy planners. The last seminar was 
conducted in September 2006 and discussed some issues and 
challenges that are most likely to face Mongolia in the 
future. The challenges were mainly constituted of the 
implementation of the program entitled “Armed Forces 
Transformation Program through the year of 2015.” This 
program is a direct continuation of earlier defense 
development and reform programs of 1993, 1997, and 2002. 
Frankly, these defense development and reform programs are 
the most current defense policy documents. Even though, the 
previous programs were not fully implemented, because of 
the shortage of the funds and weak political support from 
the top civilian authorities at the decision making levels, 
 
111 The U.S. Department of Defense, “Rumsfeld’s Mongolia Visit 




these programs are significant documents for the 
transformation and development of the Mongolian Armed 
Forces’ challenge of fulfilling its new objectives of 
peacekeeping and other issues over the last few years of 
the new democracy’s development. 
D. CHAPTER FINDINGS 
Both Estonian and Mongolian national security and 
national defense policy planning began for the same reasons 
and objectives in the 1990s. Over time, Estonian defense 
policy planning headed toward securing its national 
security and defense interests through the protective 
membership of larger institutions; however, Mongolia chose 
to establish a self-defense and territorial defense system 
for itself and looked toward its “third neighbors” for 
assuring its national security and defense interests and 
for international cooperative purposes. 
The process of Estonian defense policy planning went 
through tough challenges in order to become a member of the 
larger institutions and it still needs to accomplish more 
complicated policy planning for assuring and strengthening 
its continuing membership. The defense policies and 
strategies, the National Security Concept and the National 
Military Strategy, have similar content to that of the 
United States.  
From an independent country’s point of view, the 
Estonian defense policy planning has both advantage and 
disadvantage. The advantageous side concerns the idea that 
it is now part of large organizational structures, the EU 
and NATO. Estonia has no need to worry about its security, 
either internally or externally. However, the 
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disadvantageous side of it is that it sustains itself as an 
independent country in its defense field. In 1956, Charles 
Lerche wrote, in his Principles of International Politics, 
that “by choosing membership in a larger political 
community, the small states sacrifice complete self-
determination but gain in return the greater protection and 
more solid economic foundation that flows from membership 
in a broader organization.”112 From now on, Estonia needs to 
play by these large institutional rules. However, one could 
argue that this way is the best for a small country to 
protect itself, or one could argue that globalization will 
lead in this direction anyway, so it does not matter what 
specific interest that small country may have. The next 
largest challenge that might be faced would be that of its 
obligation to both large institutions at the same time. 
Providing forces to the EU Battle Group and NATO Response 
Force and other international military operations will 
challenge its capabilities to the fulfillment of its 
commitment to the EU and NATO. Estonian defense policy 
planning has completed the critical phase of its 
development. Its further defense policy planning depends on 
its ability to cooperate with larger institutions for the 
purpose of manipulating them for providing for security its 
national security and national defense. 
As for the Mongolian defense policy planning, Mongolia 
needs to look back at its defense policies once more. The 
question that needs attention is this: is the 1998 state 
military policy still an appropriate response for the 
current world defense issues and challenges? Perhaps 
 
112 Charles Lerche, “Problem Areas: Political” Principles of 
International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), 327. 
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Mongolia should address the state of affairs of 2007 and 
align its needs to those changing and evolving issues. 
Instead of having static doctrines, Mongolia should develop 
National Security or National Military Strategies that 
could be more flexible and reflective to world current 
security and defense issues and challenges. Comparing its 
defense policy planning with its Estonian counterparts 
might mislead the results of a comparative case study 
because of Estonian membership into the EU and NATO; but, 
it is certainly one lesson from which Mongolia can learn. 
The processes of identifying Mongolian defense capability 
needs, establishing priorities, and examining options for 
meeting those needs constitute the framework for its 
defense policy planning development. In spite of the fact 
that Mongolian economic capability, limited funds, and an 
insufficient budget are the major difficulties for 
implementing these direct development programs and needs, 
Mongolia continues to strive to build a more manageable and 
professional Armed Forces within its available resources. 
Both countries have accomplished the initial phase of 
democratic transition successfully and have reached certain 
objectives in their defense policy planning. The next phase 










































                    
IV. WHAT CAN MONGOLIA LEARN FROM OTHERS’ DEFENSE 
POLICY PLANNING? 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The Mongolian defense policy planning process is 
stable because there are no threats from its two 
neighboring countries and there is little interest by key 
decision making political actors in Mongolia. The 2001 
Mongolian Defense White Paper states that “building of the 
Armed Forces of Mongolia is not connected with the problem 
of possible threats only but more with the existence of 
core national values and interests, and peaceful desire of 
the people to protect and inherit them.”113 The status of 
this statement has not changed much since the publication 
of this document, but world-wide current issues and 
challenges regarding national security and defense have 
changed drastically since then. 
The issues and challenges of the Mongolian defense 
policy planning environment which was discussed in the 
previous chapter’s subsection are the main discussion 
points in this chapter.  
What can Mongolia learn from other democratic 
countries, especially concerning the planning process? 
Lessons learned, defense policy planning techniques, and 
issues and challenges regarding this matter are open to 
adaptation into the Mongolian defense policy planning 
practice; however, the most critical lessons and processes 
that would be favorable or appropriate for the current 
Mongolian situation is discussed in the following sections. 
 
113 Ministry of Defense, Mongolian Defense White Paper, 2001 
(Ulaanbaatar: MOD, 2001), 97. 
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B. WHAT CAN MONGOLIA LEARN ON PROCESSES OF DEFENSE POLICY 
PLANNING? 
The world is evolving and things are changing; 
Mongolia needs to get in tune with it in terms of its 
defense policy planning. Estonia found its way to plan its 
defense policy by joining the EU and the NATO. From now on, 
Estonia enjoys a great deal of protection, as well as 
responsibility.  
What should Mongolia do? Does it need to join large 
institutions for securing its defense policy interests or 
retain neutrality, or actively participate in international 
military operations in order to protect Mongolian 
existence?  
This chapter section raises some arguments about 
Mongolia’s current defense policy planning, and based on 
these identified issues and challenges, possible options 
and solutions for Mongolia will be reviewed. 
1. Conceptual Doctrines and No Strategies 
If the National Security Concept of 1992 and the Basis 
of the State Military Policy of Mongolia of 1998 are the 
basis of the fundamentals of concepts and legislature, 
Mongolia has to have a defense policy and strategy on how 
to support its conceptual basis of the Concept of National 
Security and the Basis of the State Military Policy of 
Mongolia. These two documents are broad concepts or 
principles, not a strategy of how to achieve objectives. 
Policy and strategy need to be adjusted according to 
current national security and defense interests of the 
country, as well as its resources. It is true that it is 
almost impossible to follow certain doctrines or concepts 
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for many years in today’s rapid development of information 
and technology, revolution of military affairs, 
unpredictable challenges of terrorism, and globalization, 
especially in national security and national defense policy 
environment.  
The Mongolian defense policy planning process has a 
missing link in the middle of the planning process of top 
to bottom planning. The system currently installed in the 
Mongolian defense policy planning process is based on its 
Government Action Plan and defense developmental reform 
programs. Every four years, a new government announces its 
action plan for a whole four-year term and the State Great 
Hural approves it. Based on the approved Action Plan, the 
Mongolian Government brings its implementation plan to the 
ministries. Each ministry has a responsibility for planning 
its implementation plan accordingly. At the operational 
level, all agencies are also responsible for making their 
implementation plan. This process seems a simple process, 
but there is a missing link between policy guidance, the 
Government action plan, and the implementation plan, which 
would be a defined strategy of how to achieve its policy 
goals using whatever means (resources). The aforementioned 
Government implementation plan, or the Ministry of 
Defense’s implementation plan, can’t constitute strategy. 
Because these implementation plans direct who does what and 
when, but say nothing about how to achieve the given 
objectives and obtain the resources needed, a strategy must 
be created between a policy guidance plan and an 
implementation plan and then linked together as a policy 
planning system. 
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Even the Government Action Plan and its Implementation 
Plan are very constricted for consideration as policy 
guidance. The Action Plan is quite similar to the list of 
objectives which directs who needs to do what and when. The 
Implementation Plan is a little detailed list, but offers 
no resource-related guidelines. From here, another major 
problem occurs. How will these implementation plans, 
without specifically authorized resources connect with the 
budgeting cycle and further policy planning development? 
Perhaps the reason why some defense development and reform 
programs could not be fully implemented is due to this 
policy planning gap. Even though the programs are approved 
by the President, some objectives and goals of these 
programs, such as the renovation and overhaul of some 
weaponry systems, couldn’t be implemented due to weak 
political support from the top civilian authorities as well 
as the nation’s economic priorities for other public 
services. The series of Mongolian reform programs114 since 
1992 helped to change the military’s thinking, but not that 
of the civilian authorities, who approve the budget. Due to 
a low interest and little understanding of the military 
from higher civilian authorities, the Mongolian defense 
policy is not been given importance and significance. The 
outcome of this lack of interest could cause severe damage 
or setbacks to Mongolian defense. The point is that these 
plans and programs can not substitute for national defense 
or national military strategies. 
 
114 The author means by that the following programs: “Development 
Program for the Armed Forces” of 1993-1997, “Military Reform Policy” of 
1997-2001, the “Development program of the Military Establishment till 
2005” of 2002, and “Armed Forces Transformation Program through the 
year of 2015” of 2006. 
It’s important to note that not only Mongolian defense 
policy planning, but also other Mongolian public services 
and ministries, have to plan according to this model. The 
Government forms this plan through its administrative 
structure. It would seem that this model is reminiscent of 
the old Soviet-type of centralized planning system, but not 






Figure 7.   Missing Link between a Policy Guidance and 
Implementation plan 
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objectives, being understood at the lower level as how to 
perform, and being assessed the whole defense policy 
planning process that recommending possible changes back to 
the policy, Mongolia would have an ideal type of policy 
planning process. 
This issue opens the way to the next issue of defense 
institutional structure. 
2. Actors and Institutions 
Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze point out in, Who 
Guards the Guardians and How, that based on their 
observations and experience in the United States, Portugal, 
Spain, and several other newer democracies, there are three 
initial requirements which will allow an institution, such 
as the Ministry of Defense to be successful, “in the first, 
the Ministry of Defense managers must build workable 
structures and processes, supported by a firm legal status 
and resources, in the second, the Ministry of Defense must 
be staffed with informed and responsible professional 
civilians who can expect some degree of permanence of their 
position, and in the third, the Ministry of Defense will 
need a mechanism to incorporate military officers and 
utilize their professional backgrounds and expertise to 
support ministry policymaking.”115  
In the case of the Mongolian Ministry of Defense, the 
first requirement can be seen as half-implemented, 
conforming events were the impetus for the creation of the 
 
115 Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze, “Ministries of Defense ad 
Democratic Control,” in Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations, ed. Scott Tollefson and Thomas Bruneau 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 92. 
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Ministry of Defense and the creation of basic legal 
documents. The only problem here is that the Mongolian 
Ministry of Defense doesn’t actually control the full 
budget that’s allocated from the government. The portfolio 
is under the name of the Minister of Defense, but the Chief 
of General Staff has the full authority to spend its 
operational expense. This means that the Ministry of 
Defense has four agencies, including the General Staff. 
According to the Law on Management and Finance of 
Government Agencies, the agency’s manager (in case of the 
General Staff, the Chief of General Staff is the agency 
manager) and his share in the Defense Minister’s portfolio 
is ¾, which enables him to spend three times more than the 
minister itself. The second requirement for staffing the 
Ministry of Defense with professional civilians needs to be 
performed fully. Currently, the civilian personnel 
situation is very difficult, especially for young defense 
experts. Their salary is relatively low compared to the 
private sector and their work status is lower than the 
former military and retired officers who are not 
specialized in that position, but appointed by political 
appointees or others. For these reasons the result is that 
civilians seek out jobs within the private sector. The last 
requirement for choosing professional military officers for 
support ministry policymaking, is working very well in the 
current Mongolian Ministry of Defense, because of the low 
number of personnel in the ministry and heavy workload. 
The Ministry of Defense is one of the main 
institutions primarily responsible for Mongolian defense 
policy planning, but the source of the main problem might 
be at a higher level of political decision making. The 
 80
                    
Ministry of Defense can not set a policy or strategy for 
the country if there is no clear policy guidance and 
direction from the Government, the President, the State 
Great Hural, or the National Security Council of Mongolia. 
Even though the Ministry of Defense works hard and 
introduces a new national defense strategy or military 
strategy it is unlikely to earn support at the level of 
political decision making. Politicians are supposed to set 
political guidance, policy direction, and strategies, and 
to provide resources that military can implement and use.116 
In this case, the military needs to attract the 
politicians’ attention about defense policy. How? In the 
last few years, Mongolian peacekeepers have played a 
significant role in promoting the Mongolian military at the 
international level. This could be one factor that might 
attract politicians to take an interest in defense policy 
matters.  
3. Lessons Learned 
Besides knowing how other democratic countries set up 
their defense policy plans, it is important to critique 
their defense policies.  
In the case of Estonia, its defense policy planning 
system has just been installed and its membership in larger 
institutions is only three years old. Perhaps not enough 
time has passed to review or assess the success of the 
whole process yet. These issues will be considered in their 
renewal of the National Military Strategy in late 2007.117 
 
116 See Porch, 101. 
117 Jaan Murumets, e-mail message to author. 26 February 2007. 
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In the case of Mongolia, it is difficult to say that 
it has a formal review process. It would seem that the 
current review procedure is an evaluation process of the 
aforementioned Implementation Plans for reprimanding and 
punishing, but it does not give recommendations or 
suggestions for policy guidance. The Institute for 
Strategic Studies of Mongolia, the Institute for Defense 
Studies, and the Academy of Defense Management at the 
Defense University should pay more attention to the 
development of a policy review and assessment process.  
In the case of the Unites States, it has plenty of 
lessons on this matter. They would include QDRs, the Beyond 
Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, II, and III reports, other think 
tank organizations’ and institutes’ reports and analyses, 
and individual analysts’ work. These institutions’ and 
individuals’ recommendations for reform are valuable 
comments and ideas for American national security and 
national defense policy planners. 
C. CHAPTER FINDINGS 
The thesis discusses a wide range of defense policy 
planning aspects of actors and institutions, and issues and 
challenges in the case of the United States, Estonia, and 
Mongolia. In this chapter, based on the definition of 
Mongolia’s current defense policy planning environment, how 
Mongolia can learn from other democracies’ defense policy 
planning, what the hindrances are to solving current issues 
and challenges, and what the possible recommendations are 
for Mongolia have been discussed. 
The current peaceful and friendly relations with its 
two neighboring countries is great, but no one knows what 
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will happen in the next five or ten years in Asia, 
especially in this uncertain time of security issues, such 
as Taiwan’s intention for independence, North Korea’s 
possession of nuclear capability, and a rise of new 
regional power in the region – China, Japan, India, etc. 
All of these events and this chapter suggest that Mongolia 
should not wait for something to happen in terms of 
national security and national defense, and Mongolia should 
prepare for uncertainty. 
The 1994 and 1998 Concepts and Basis are the policy 
fundamentals and principles. Based on these Concepts and in 
accordance with policy guidance, the Government Action 
Plan, Mongolia should develop its strategies in order to 
achieve the goals and objectives of these Concepts and 
guidance. The available lessons to learn from other 
democracies are plenty, but only dedicated research, 
analysis, and study can lead Mongolia toward effective 













                    
V. CONCLUSION 
A defense policy planning process for a democratic 
country depends on a country’s democratic organizational 
structure, institutional tradition, leadership roles, and 
specific defense needs. The key processes are decision-
making, who makes the decisions, how to allocate resources, 
what investments to make, and how to set guidelines and 
strategies in order to get jobs done. Charles Hitch pointed 
out in the early 1960s that the “national security, from 
the point of view of an economist, may be said to depend on 
three things: (1) the quantity of national resources 
available, now and in the future; (2) the proportion of 
these resources allocated to national security purposes; 
and (3) the efficiency with which the resources so 
allocated are used.”118 Even though, world security and 
defense issues have changed over time, the use of defense 
resources and the need for its effective allocation has not 
changed much. 
Defense policy planning in democratic countries 
varies, but some main policy doctrines have similarities; 
for example, almost all democratic countries have their own 
concepts or policy documents for their national security 
and foreign or defense matters. They are similar in that 
all doctrines and strategies seek to ensure a country’s 
national interests, defense needs, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and necessary institutional arrangements to 
achieve these. Differences can be found in the 
 
118 Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, “Defense as an economic 
problem,” The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1961), 4. 
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international relations environment, its democratic 
institutional structure, the way of founding or 
establishment, individual roles of its leadership, and the 
challenges of each. In order to have a strategy, an 
institution or a nation has to have a clear policy which 
leads the institution or the nation to discover what it 
will do. Then the strategy comes after the policy, which 
leads the institution or the nation to discover how it will 
do it. 
Ochmanek and Hosmer point out that in the presence of 
uncertainty, “planners must ensure that the scenarios they 
use to shape and assess their programs capture a broad 
range of potential challenges. But strategy is more than 
just coping with a fixed set of conditions and fitting 
available resources to a given environment. A key function 
of strategy is to shape that environment in directions 
helpful to one’s own interests.”119 From their point of 
view, uncertainty can be manageable “while we may be 
uncertain about the future course of events, we can 
identify with great clarity those things that we do and do 
not want to happen, and our strategy is, in part, directed 
toward ensuring that desired outcomes occur and undesired 
ones do not occur.”120  
The lessons from the United States, Estonia, and 
Mongolia present three different cases. The first case, the 
United States, is an established democracy with powerful 
defense capabilities and complicated defense policy 
 
119 David Ochmanek and Stephen Hosmer, “The Context for Defense 
Planning: The Environment, Strategy, and Missions” Strategic Appraisal 
1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 1997), 38. 
120 Ibid. 
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planning systems. The U.S. case also suggests that its 
defense policy planning system gets larger as it confronts 
challenging issues. Correcting the system itself is a huge 
process and effort within the Government interagency 
process can not be easy. Moreover, CSIS’s Beyond Goldwater-
Nichols Phase 1, 2, and 3 Reports recommended that the Cold 
War-constructed Industrial Age structure and processes were 
not appropriate in a new Information Age.121 The United 
States defense policy planners would do well to pay more 
attention to its interagency cooperation and national 
security institutional structure for effective planning.  
The second case, Estonia, is a new democracy with a 
newly established defense force, but the membership within 
larger institutions help Estonia to enjoy the initial 
transitional period with speed. The Estonian case suggests 
that its initial success, however, does not fully release 
Estonia from its further defense policy planning 
responsibilities. Estonia needs to strengthen its role 
through membership within larger institutions, to enhance 
its capability through participation in international 
military operations, and to keep its commitment to the EU 
and NATO, as well as to other member countries.  
The third case, Mongolia, is a new democracy that 
seeks its next solutions for a defense policy planning 
process. The thesis aims to define the Mongolia’s current 
defense policy planning process and to ascertain possible 
lessons for further development if needed. The overall 
 
121 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Executive 
Summary,” Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a new Strategic 
Era, Phase I Report (Washington D.C.: CSIS, March 2004), 6, On-line, 
internet, 24 January 2007, available from 
http://www.csis.org/isp/bgn/reports/. 
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findings in this thesis suggest that Mongolian defense 
policy planning is needed to set and define its strategies, 
which enables it to support its capabilities, to maintain 
its development, and to plan effectively in order to 
manipulate or manage its capabilities within available 
defense resources. In order to set its defense strategies 
Mongolia should develop National Security or National 
Defense Strategic planning documents at the upper-most 
political decision-making levels. Even though, Mongolia has 
stable security relations with its two neighboring 
countries, it is time for Mongolia to awake and move 
forward, strengthen its capabilities, and advance its 
initial achievements in democracy by preparing for today’s 
uncertain and unpredictable world. Mongolia should also be 
aware of current world national security and national 
defense issues and challenges and their review, assessment, 
or recommendation documents, such as the U.S.’s QDR. These 
documents give insightful guidance, comment, and 
observation, and explain reasons and motivations which can 
be critical for Mongolia’s learning curve. 
The thesis concludes that a country must have a 
defense policy that represents that country’s basic defense 
needs and interests, assures security guarantees, and 
provides strategies for achieving the goals of defined 
defense policies. A country must first set its security and 
defense policy. It must then define the strategies to 
achieve its security and defense policy. Finally, it must 
provide support to its institutions and services with 
strategies to operationalize its security and defense 
policy. Based on implementation and operational process, a 
review process is needed, which leads to recommendation 
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back to the policy guidance. This policy planning process 
is common for any democratic country, whether large or 
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